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Abstract
How do defaults and bankruptcies affect optimal health insurance policy? I answer this ques-
tion, using a life-cycle model of health investment with an option to default on emergency room
(ER) bills and financial debts. I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and compare the opti-
mal health insurance policies according to whether the option to default is available. I find that
the option to default induces the optimal policy to be more redistributive. Without the option
to default, the optimal policy expands Medicaid for households whose income is below 30.8
percent of the average income without changing policies related to private health insurance.
With the option to default, in addition to Medicaid expansion, the optimal policy offers a pro-
gressive subsidy for the purchase of private health insurance to all households whose income is
above the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid and reforms the private health insurance
market by improving coverage rates and preventing price discrimination based on pre-existing
conditions. This disparity implies that households rely on bankruptcies and defaults on ER
bill as implicit health insurance. More redistributive reforms can improve welfare by reducing
the dependence on this implicit health insurance and changing households’ medical spending
behavior to be more preventative.
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1 Introduction
Recently, a growing body of empirical studies has investigated the interactions between health-
related events and household finance. Many studies have found that healthcare reforms and ad-
verse health-related events affect households’ financial outcomes, such as bankruptcy, delinquency,
credit scores, and unpaid debts (Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Mazumder and Miller (2016); Hu
et al. (2018); Miller et al. (2018); Dobkin et al. (2018); Deshpande et al. (2019)). Mahoney (2015)
shows that bankruptcy and emergency room act as implicit health insurance because households
with a lower cost of bankruptcy are reluctant to buy health insurance by relying on these institu-
tional features. These empirical findings have been widely used to support the expansion of health
insurance coverage against financial shocks due to health issues. However, there are relatively
few structural approaches that examine how defaults and bankruptcies affect the design of opti-
mal health insurance policy because it is difficult to devise a framework that incorporates complex
features of institutions for both bankruptcy and health insurance entailing multiple trade-offs in
welfare changes. In this paper, I fill this void by using a rich general equilibrium model to charac-
terize the optimal health insurance policy according to whether the option to default is available.
The assessment of health insurance policies is related to several off-setting forces in welfare
changes. On the one hand, health insurance can improves welfare by mitigating health losses by
providing more access to healthcare services due to a decrease in out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Health insurance may induce further improvements in welfare because it reduces bankruptcies and
defaults on medical bills by insuring financial risks from medical issues. On the other hand, ex-
panding health insurance coverage can deteriorate welfare because more taxes must be levied in
order to be financed. This increase in taxes increases the distortions of saving and labor supply, re-
ducing the average income. General equilibrium effects even amplify this reduction in the average
income by boosting the decrease in the aggregate supply of savings. Therefore, these trade-offs
must be quantified to characterize optimal health insurance policies.
I undertake my quantitative analysis by building a model on the consumer bankruptcy frame-
work used in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007); Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt
(2007) and the health capital framework of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017). Asset markets are in-
complete, and households have an option to default on their medical bills and financial debts. If
a debtor defaults on his debt, the debt is eliminated, but his credit history is damaged. This de-
fault is recorded in his credit history, which hinders his borrowing in the future. The loan price
differs across individual states, as it is determined by individual expected default probabilities. In
the spirit of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017), health capital is a component of individual utility and
affects labor productivity and the mortality rate. Moreover, health shocks depreciate the stock of
health capital, which results in reduced utility, labor productivity, and survival probability.
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This model extends the standard health capital model in two directions. First, the model con-
siders two types of health shocks: emergency and non-emergency. This setting is chosen to reflect
the institutional features of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which
is an important channel for defaults on medical bills, as Mahoney (2015) and Dobkin, Finkelstein,
Kluender and Notowidigdo (2018) note in their empirical analyses.1 Second, motivated by the
study of Galama and Kapteyn (2011), health capital determines not the level of health but the
distributions of these health shocks. This setting helps to address a well-known criticisms of the
model of Grossman (1972). The model of Grossman (1972) predicts that the demand for medical
services is positively related to health status, but these factors are negatively related in the actual
data. With this setting, the model generates a negative relationship between the demand for medi-
cal services and health status because households who accumulate a higher level of health capital
stock have a lower probability of emergency medical events and severe medical conditions. This
setup additionally enables me to capture the additional preventative medical treatment effects of
health insurance policies.
Using micro and macro data, I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy before the Affordable
Care Act (ACA). This model performs well in matching life-cycle and cross-sectional moments
on income, health insurance, medical expenditures, medical conditions, and emergency room (ER)
visits. The model accounts for salient life-cycle and cross-sectional dimensions of health insur-
ance and health inequality. Furthermore, it reproduces the untargeted interrelationships among
income, medical conditions, and ER visits.2 These strong performances are largely achieved by
the extended health capital framework. The model is also good at capturing important life-cycle
and cross-sectional dimensions of credit and bankruptcy.
To characterize optimal health insurance policies, this paper focuses on three health insurance
policy objects: the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid, the subsidy rule for the purchase of
private individual health insurance (IHI), and a reform of the IHI market that improves its coverage
rates up to those of employer-based health insurance and prevents price discrimination against
pre-exiting conditions.3 These policy components are parameterized by three parameters. This
setting is sufficiently flexible to represent not only pre-existing healthcare systems around the world
but also alternative healthcare reforms recently proposed in the U.S. Based on this flexibility, I
1In the U.S., hospitals can assess the financial status of non-emergency patients before providing non-emergency
medical treatment, but they cannot take this financial screening step before providing emergency medical treatment
due to regulations in the EMTALA. Prior to the implementation of the EMTALA, “patient dumping”, referring to
refusing ER treatment due to the patients’ lack of insurance and ability to pay, was allowed.
2Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I find that the levels of health risks vary across
income groups. Low-income households tend to have more severe medical conditions and to visit emergency rooms
more frequently over the life-cycle.Appendix B describes the details of these empirical findings.
3This setting is motivated by the fact that healthcare reforms proposed in the U.S., such as the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) and the American Health Care Act (AHCA), have mainly addressed policies of Medicaid and IHI.
2
characterize the optimal health insurance, which is summarized by a set of these three parameters
maximizing a utilitarian welfare function that values the ex ante lifetime utility of an agent born
into the stationary equilibrium.
First, I use the calibrated model to investigate the effect of the option to default on the economy
under the baseline health insurance system. The model predicts that the absence of the option to de-
fault induces additional precautionary motives against health risks, thereby leading to increases in
medical spending, health insurance coverage, and saving. When available, households can use the
option to default as implicit health insurance because they can rely on this option to insure against
financial and health risks. In contrast, in the economy without the option to default, households
are more cautious in managing their health and spend on healthcare to be more preventative be-
cause poor health would otherwise come at a substantial financial burden over the life-cycle. These
additional precautionary motives against health risks cause households to increase their spending
on healthcare services, demand for private health insurance, and assets accumulation during the
working-age period. These additional precautionary motives are so quantitatively substantial as to
affect the aggregate economy. Eliminating the option to default increases health insurance coverage
by 6.5 percentage points, the average medical expenditure by 2.2 percent, and the capital-output
ratio by 5 percent. These changes imply that the impact of implicit health insurance is sufficiently
large to cause changes in the aggregate economy.
Then, I seek the optimal health insurance with and without the option to default. I find that
the option to default makes substantial differences in the features of the optimal health insurance
policies. In the economy with no option to default, the optimal health insurance policy is to expand
Medicaid for households whose income is lower than 30.8 percent of the average income, while
it does not change policies related to IHI. In contrast, in the economy with the option to default,
the optimal health insurance system is more redistributive. This optimal health insurance policy
provides Medicaid to households whose income is lower than 30.3 percent of the average income
and offers a progressive subsidy for the purchase of IHI to all households whose income is above
the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid. The optimal policy reforms the IHI market by im-
proving its coverage rates and preventing price discrimination against households with pre-existing
conditions.
The disparity in these optimal policies is closely related to differences in the degree of the
responsiveness of households’ medical spending and consumption to healthcare reforms, accord-
ing to whether the option to default is available. Although more redistributive healthcare reforms
increase the overall levels of medical spending, regardless of whether the option to default is avail-
able, the magnitude is larger in the economy with the option to default. More redistributive health
insurance policies reduce the dependence on implicit health insurance by providing young and
low-income households with more access to healthcare services by decreasing the effective prices
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of health insurance for these households. These changes bring about a greater increase in medical
spending and a further reduction in inequality. While more redistributive health insurance policies
play a role in reducing average consumption due to the more taxes to be financed, the magnitude
is larger in the economy without the option to default because the stronger precautionary saving
motives induce a further reduction in the aggregate capital following the reforms. This reduction
in aggregate capital is amplified due to a larger increase in the risk-free interest rate in general
equilibrium, thereby leading to a further decline in consumption.
These additional variations in consumption and medical spending lead to differences in the
magnitude of off-setting forces in welfare changes. In the economy with the option to default,
further improvements in welfare are driven by the reform of the IHI market and the provision of
subsidies for the purchase of IHI because these policies enhance health outcomes for young and
low-income households by increasing their spending on medical services due to the reduced de-
pendence on implicit health insurance. These IHI-related policies incur greater welfare losses from
changes in consumption in the economy without the option to default. These policies bring about
a further decline in the aggregate capital from tax distortions due to a greater reduction in precau-
tionary saving. This decrease in aggregate capital is amplified by a larger increase in the risk-free
interest rate in general equilibrium, thereby leading changes in consumption to reduce welfare fur-
ther. This finding implies that in economies where bankruptcies and defaults are easily accessible,
more redistributive healthcare reforms can bring further improvements in welfare by reducing the
dependence on this implicit health insurance and changing households’ medical spending behavior
to be more preventative.
Related Literature: This paper belongs to the stream of model-based quantitative macroeconomic
literature that investigates the aggregate and distributional implications of health-related public
policies.4 My work is most closely linked to the following papers. Hall and Jones (2007) motivates
the modeling setting of this paper regarding how to address the value of life, but the focus of
this paper is different from theirs. While Hall and Jones (2007) investigated why U.S. medical
spending has risen over time, this paper explores how bankruptcies and defaults affect the design
of optimal health insurance policies. The study of Jeske and Kitao (2009) is closely related to this
paper because it examined the quantitative importance of the interactions between health insurance
and other types of public policies. Jeske and Kitao (2009) emphasize the quantitative role of
the interactions between the US regressive taxes and health insurance system, while this paper
highlights the interactions between the health insurance system and household bankruptcy. Zhao
(2014) finds that Social Security increases aggregate health spending by reallocating resources to
4Suen et al. (2006); Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2010); Ales, Hosseini and Jones (2012); Ozkan (2014);
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013); Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2014); Yogo (2016); Jung and Tran (2016); Nakajima
and Tu¨zemen (2017); Zhao (2017); Feng and Zhao (2018) are broadly included in this literature.
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the old whose marginal propensity to spending on health is high. His study is similar to my work
in the sense that both investigate the effect of another type of public policy on health spending.
However, my work focuses not on the effects of Social Security but on the impacts of defaults
and bankruptcies. Cole, Kim and Krueger (2018) investigated the trade-off between the short-run
benefits of generous health insurance policies and the long-run effects of health investment such as
not smoking and exercising. The modeling strategy they used for health risks is similar to that used
in this work, as the distribution of health shocks depends on health status. In addition, their result
for the optimal health insurance policy is similar to that in my work in the sense that providing full
insurance is sub-optional. However, Cole et al. (2018) did not consider risk-sharing against health
risks through defaults and the accumulation of physical capital, which are formalized in my model.
This paper also contributes to the consumer bankruptcy literature based on quantitative mod-
els. Li and Sarte (2006) emphasize the importance of general equilibrium effects in the choice of
bankruptcy policy reform. This paper argues that general equilibrium effects are also important in
designing optimal health insurance policies due to the interactions between household bankruptcy
and health insurance. Athreya (2008) investigated the interactions between default and social insur-
ance. This paper extends his work by investigating the role of household bankruptcy in designing
optimal health insurance policies. In this model, defaults and bankruptcies are based on the mod-
eling setting proposed in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007) in the sense that loan
prices are characterized by individual states, medical expenses represent a primary driver of de-
fault, and ex-post defaults exist in general equilibrium. Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) is also
closely related to this paper, as they examined the effects of bankruptcy policies on consumption
smoothing across states and over the life-cycle. In both Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits et al.
(2007), medical expenses are an important driving force of defaults, but neither study included the
details of health insurance policies that reshape the distribution of default risks for medical reasons
across households. This paper extends these studies by employing the institutional details of health
insurance policies with endogenous health in the consumer bankruptcy framework.
This study is linked to a growing stream of the empirical literature addressing the relationship
between health-related events and household financial well-being.5 Among these empirical studies,
5These empirical studies estimated the effect of adverse health events and healthcare reforms on household finan-
cial consequences such as bankruptcy, delinquency, credit scores and unpaid debt. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011)
empirically show that Medicaid expansion for children reduced the probability of bankruptcy. Mazumder and Miller
(2016) find that the Massachusetts healthcare reform decreased bankruptcy, delinquency and the amount of debt and
improved credit scores. Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, Miller and Wong (2018) find that Medicaid expansion under the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) generally improved financial well-being for low-income households. Miller, Hu, Kaestner,
Mazumder and Wong (2018) empirically show that Medicaid expansion under the ACA reduced unpaid bills, medical
bills, over-limit credit card spending, delinquencies and public records in Michigan. Dobkin, Finkelstein, Kluender
and Notowidigdo (2018) show that hospital admission reduced earnings, income, access to credit and consumer bor-
rowing and increased out-of-pocket medical spending, unpaid medical bills and bankruptcy. Deshpande, Gross and
Su (2019) find that disability programs reduced the probability of adverse financial events such as bankruptcy and
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the most closely related paper is Mahoney (2015). He finds that ER and bankruptcy act as implicit
health insurance because individuals with a lower financial cost of bankruptcy are more reluctant
to purchase health insurance and make lower out-of-pocket medical payments conditional on the
amount of care received. This study incorporates these institutional features in a structural model
and finds that they are substantially important in designing the optimal health insurance policy
because this implicit health insurance influences households’ medical spending behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, defines the equi-
librium, and explains the algorithm for the numerical solution. Section 3 describes the calibration
strategy and the performance of the model. Section 4 presents the results of the policy analysis.
Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Model
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Household Environments
Demographics: The economy is populated by a continuum of households in J overlapping
generations. This is a triennial model. They begin at age J0 and work. They retire at age
Jr, and the maximum survival age is J¯ . In each period, the survival rate is endogenously
determined. The model has exogenous population growth rate n. There are 7 age groups,
jg : 23− 34, 35− 46, 47− 55, 56− 64, 65− 76, 77− 91 and 92− 100.
Preferences: Preferences are represented by an isoelastic utility function over an aggregate that
is itself a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function over consumption c and current health
status hc,
u(c, hc) =
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu (1)
where λu is the weight on consumption, v is the elasticity of substitution between consumption c
and health status hc, and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Following Hall and Jones
(2007), Bu is a sufficiently large constant to guarantee that the value of life is positive.
foreclosure.
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Labor Income: Working households at age j receive an idiosyncratic labor income yj given by
log (yj) = log (w) + log (ω¯j) + φh log (hc) + log (η) (2)
η
′
= ρηη + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N(0, σǫ)
wherew is the aggregate market wage, ω¯j is a deterministic age term, hc is the current health status,
φh is the elasticity of labor income yj to health status hc and η is an idiosyncratic productivity
shock. η follows the above AR-1 process with a persistence of ρη and a persistent shock ǫ with a
normal distribution.
Health Technology: In the model, health shocks interact with health capital. First, given health
capital, I demonstrate how health shocks evolve. Second, I describe how health capital is intertem-
porally determined.
Given the empirical importance of the effect of ER on household finance (Mahoney (2015),
Dobkin et al. (2018)), the model has two types of health shocks: emergency ǫe and non-emergency
ǫn. These two shocks determine current health status hc in the following way:
hc = (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h (3)
where hc is the current health status, ǫe is an emergency health shock, ǫn is a non-emergency health
shock, and h is the stock of health capital. Emergency health shocks ǫe and non-emergency health
shocks ǫn depreciate health capital h, and the remaining health capital becomes the current health
status hc. Note that current health status hc is different from the stock of health capital h.
The data demonstrate that unhealthy and low-income households are more likely to visit ERs.
This finding implies that a part of the probability of emergency medical events is endogenously
determined. To capture this, I model emergency medical events as follows.
Households face emergency health shocks ǫe only when they experience an emergency medical
event. The probability of emergency medical events is as follows:
Xer =

1 with probability
(1−h+κe)
Ajg
0 with probability 1− (1−h+κe)
Ajg
(4)
where Xer is a random variable of emergency medical events, and h is the stock of health capital.
Regarding the probability function of emergency medical events, ke is the scale parameter, and
Ajg is the age group effect parameter. ke controls the average probability of emergency room
events, and Ajg influences the difference in probability across age groups. Households experience
an emergency medical event Xer = 1 with probability (1 − h + κe)/Ajg . This equation implies
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that health capital h determines the probability of emergency medical events.6 When a household
has more health capital, it is less likely to experience emergency medical events.
Conditional on an emergency medical event, Xer = 1, emergency health shocks ǫe evolve as
follows:
ǫe =

ǫse with probability pse conditional on Xer = 1ǫne with probability 1− pse conditional on Xer = 1 (5)
where
0 < ǫne < ǫse < 1 and 0 < me(ǫne) < me(ǫse)
where (ǫne) ǫse is a (non-) severe emergency health shock, pse is the probability of the realization
of a severe emergency health shock ǫse and (me(ǫne)) me(ǫse) is the medical cost of a (non-)
severe emergency medical shock. A severe emergency health shock is larger than a non-severe
emergency health shock. Examples of severe emergency health shocks include ER events such
as heart attacks and car accidents. Non-severe emergency health shocks imply less serious ER
events such as allergies or pink eye. These emergency health shocks incur emergency medical
costs me(·). Note that emergency medical costs me(·) are not a choice variable; rather they are a
function of emergency health shock ǫ ∈ {ǫne, ǫde}. Severe emergency health shocks incur higher
medical costs than non-emergency health shocks,me(ǫne) < me(ǫse).
It is worth discussing the assumptions of this setting for emergency medical events. First, the
model assumes that the probability of emergency room events is negatively related to health status,
which might cause one to be concerned about the unrealistic prediction that unhealthy households
more often have serious emergency medical events such as car accidents and gun wounds. This
prediction is inconsistent with that of the model because the probability of emergency medical
events depends not only on health status h but also on the scale parameter kc. This setting implies
that the probability of some types of emergency events, such as car accidents and gun wounds, is
independent of individuals’ health status, whereas that of other types of emergency events, such as
heart attacks and strokes, is relevant.
Second, the model assumes that spending on emergency medical treatments is given as a shock,
which makes one be worried whether it fails to capture the moral hazard behavior of low-income
households in the usage of emergency rooms. Note that frequent usage might be due not only to
moral hazard behavior but also to adverse selection stemming from poor health status. If the impact
of moral hazard behavior is quantitatively the main driving force behind the income ingredient of
6For example, let us assume that Ajg = 1 and ke = 0, and I compare two households: household A with h = 0.5
and household B with h = 0.8. Then, the probability of emergency medical events for household A is 0.5, while that
for household B is 0.2.
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ER visits, the ER cost might systematically differ across income groups, for example, because
either the rich or the poor spend more on ER healthcare conditional on visiting an ER. However,
using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I find that the amount charged for
ER events is unrelated to income level conditional on visiting an ER.7 This finding suggests that
adverse selection is quantitatively important in driving the income gradient of ER visits, which
supports the choice of the ER setting.8
Non-emergency health shock ǫn evolves as follows:
ǫn ∼ TN
(
µ = 0, σ =
((1/h)− 1 + κn)
αn
Bjg
, a = 0, b = 1
)
(6)
where TN(µ, σ, a, b) is a truncated normal distribution on bounded interval [a, b], for which the
mean and standard deviation of its original normal distribution are µ and σ, respectively. Let us
denote σ as the dispersion of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks. The dispersion σ
is a function of health capital h with three parameters: κn, αn and Bjg . Regarding the dispersion
of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks, κn is the scale parameter, αn is the curvature
parameter, andBjg is the age group effect parameter. kn controls the overall size of non-emergency
health shocks, αn determines the extent to which differences in health capital affect the level of
dispersion σ, and Bjg influences the extent to which the level of dispersion σ differs across age
groups.
Health capital determines the distribution of non-emergency health shocks through its disper-
sion σ. Figure 1 illustrates how health capital determines the distribution of non-emergency health
shocks. The horizontal axis indicates the size of non-emergency health shocks, and the verti-
cal axis indicates the value of the probability density function of non-emergency health shocks.
Given values of parameters kn, αn and Bjg , the dispersion of non-emergency health shocks,
σ = ((1/h)−1+κn)
αn
Bjg
, decreases with health capital h. Thus, the probability density function of
non-emergency health shocks tends to be concentrated more around 0 if the level of health capi-
tal h is high, as the left-hand side graph in Figure 1 shows. This concentration means that those
who accumulate a larger stock of health capital are less likely to confront a large non-emergency
health shock. On the other hand, if a household has a low stock of health capital, the dispersion
of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks is high, as the right-hand side graph in Figure
1 shows. This dispersion means that this agent is more likely to face a substantial non-emergency
health shock.
The merit of the setting for non-emergency medical events is worth noting: it enables a well-
7This result is presented in Appendix A.
8The model succeeds in generating the gap in ER visits across income groups, which will be presented in the
section on Model Performance.
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f(·;hhigh, κn, αn, Bjg)
ǫn
0 0.33 0.66 0.99
f(·;hlow, κn, αn, Bjg)
ǫn
0 0.33 0.66 0.99
Figure 1: Distribution of Non-emergency Health Shocks across Levels of Health Capital
(hhigh > hlow)
known criticism of the model of Grossman (1972) to be addressed. His model predicts that the
demand for medical and health service is positively related to health, while their relation is neg-
ative in the actual data. In the model, motivated by Galama and Kapteyn (2011), health capital
affects the distribution of health shocks such that when a person has more health capital, he is
less likely to experience severe or emergency medical events. This prediction implies that health-
ier households spend less on medical and health services, which is consistent with the empirical
findings. Additionally, this setting makes it possible to account for salient interrelations between
income and health risks observed in micro data. The data show that levels of health risks are
negatively related to income, which is endogenously generated by the model due to the setting of
non-emergency medical events.9
Tomodel health technology, I modify the health capital model of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017).
In the spirit of his work, health capital evolves as follows:
h
′
= hc + ψjgm
ϕjg
n = (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h+ ψjgm
ϕjg
n (7)
where h
′
is the stock of health capital in the next period, hc is the current health status, ǫe represents
emergency health shocks, ǫn represents non-emergency health shocks, h is the stock of health
capital in the current period, ψjg is the efficiency of non-emergency health technology for age
9Appendix B describes the details of this finding.
10
group jg, and ϕjg is the curvature of the non-emergency medical expenditure function. Households
invest in health capital through non-emergency medical expendituresmn. Then, households’ total
medical expendituresm are given by
m = mn +me(ǫ) (8)
wheremn andme(ǫe) are non-emergency and emergency medical expenditures, respectively.
Survival Probability: A Household’s survival probability is given by
πj+1|j(hc, jg) = 1− Γjg · exp (−νhc) (9)
where πj+1|j(h
′
, jg) is the survival probability of living up to age j + 1 conditional on surviving
at age j in age group jg with current health status hc, Γjg is the age group effect parameter of the
survival probability, and ν is the curvature of the survival probability with respect to current health
status hc. The age group effect parameter of the survival probability Γjg controls overall age effects
up to death. Older age groups have a higher value of Γjg . The curvature parameter of the survival
probability ν captures differences in households’ survival rate by current health status hc.
Health Insurance: The health insurance plans in the benchmark model resemble those in the U.S.
For working-age households, the choice set of health insurance plans is given by
i ∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0
(10)
where i is health insurance status, NHI indicates no health insurance, MCD is Medicaid, IHI
is private individual health insurance, EHI is employer-based health insurance, y is individual
income, y¯ is the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, and ω is the offer of employer-based
health insurance.
Medicaid MCD is available only for low-income working-age households. Thus, if a house-
hold’s income is below the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯, it can take Medicaid. Oth-
erwise, MedicaidMCD is not available as an insurance choice. Individual private health insurance
IHI is available to every working-age household. Households do not have any requirement to buy
it.
Employer-based health insurance EHI is available only to those who have an offer ω from
their employers. Jeske and Kitao (2009) show that the offer rate of employer-based health in-
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surance EHI tends to be higher in high-salary jobs. Thus, I assume that the offer of employer-
based health insurance EHI is randomly determined, and the probability of an offer of employer-
based health insurance increases with households’ persistent component of idiosyncratic labor
productivity shock η because it may capture more information on employers rather than individual
health. Explicitly, the likelihood of an offer of employer-based health insurance EHI is given by
p(EHI|η), where η is the persistent component of the idiosyncratic shock to earnings. Following
Jeske and Kitao (2009), the offer probability p(EHI|η) increases with η.
The price of private health insurance is given by
pi′ (hc, jg) =


0 if i
′
= NHI or i
′
= MCD
pIHI(hc, jg) if i
′
= IHI
pEHI if i
′
= EHI
(11)
where pi′ (·, ·) is a premium for health insurance i
′
for the next period, hc is the current health
status, and jg is the age group. pIHI(hc, jg) is the health insurance premium of private individual
health insurance IHI for an insured individual whose health status is hc within age group jg, and
pEHI is the premium for employer-based health insurance.
Individual private health insurance IHI and employer-based health insurance EHI differ in
the price system. Individual health insurance has premiums pIHI(hc, jg), where hc and jg are
the current health status and age group, respectively. This setting is based on the individual
private health insurance market in the U.S. before the ACA. Individual private health insurance
providers are allowed to differentiate prices by considering customers’ pre-existing conditions,
age and smoking status. Contrary to the separating equilibrium of individual health insurance
IHI , employer-based health insurance EHI has a single premium pEHI . This price is indepen-
dent of any individual state, which reflects that in the U.S., the providers of employer-based health
insurance cannot discriminate against employees based on their pre-existing conditions due to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In addition, a fraction ψEHI ∈ (0, 1)
of the premium pEHI is covered by employers, so insurance holders pay (1− ψEHI) · pEHI .
All health insurance plans provide coverage qi·m, and (1−qi)m becomes an out-of-pocket med-
ical expenditure for an insured household. For example, for Medicaid holders, Medicaid MCD
covers qMCD ·m, and (1− qMCD) ·m represents their out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Retired households use Medicare. Medicare is public health insurance for elderly households.
I assume that all retired households use Medicare and do not access the private health insurance
market.
Default: The model has two types of default based on the source of debt: financial default and
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non-financial default. Following Chatterjee et al. (2007), Livshits et al. (2007) and Nakajima
and Rı´os-Rull (2019), financial default is modeled to capture the procedures and consequences of
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.10 Non-financial default is modeled to reflect the features of the EMTALA.
Households have either a good credit history or a bad credit history. Good credit history means
that the credit record has no bankruptcy. Bad credit history implies that the household’s credit
record has a bankruptcy. The type of credit history determines the range of feasible actions of
households in the financial markets.
Households with a good credit history can either save or borrow through unsecured debt. They
can default on both financial and medical debts by filing for bankruptcy. In the period of filing for
bankruptcy, these households can neither save nor dis-save. They have a bad credit history in the
next period. If a household with a good credit history either has no debt or repays its unsecured
debt, it preserves its good credit history in the next period.
Households with a bad credit history pay a cost for having a bad credit history that is as much
as χ portion of their earnings for each period. Households with a bad credit history can save assets
but cannot borrow from financial intermediaries. Because of the absence of financial debt, they
do not engage in financial default. However, they can default on emergency medical expenses,
as the EMTALA requires hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment to patients on credit
regardless of patients’ ability to pay the emergency medical costs. In the period when defaulting
on emergency medical expenses, these households cannot save, and they preserve the bad credit
history in the next period. Unless they default, with an exogenous probability λ, their bad credit
history changes to a good credit history in the next period.
Tax System and Government Budget: Taxes are levied from two sources: payroll and income.
On the one hand, Social Security and Medicare are financed through payroll tax. τss is the payroll
tax rate for Social Security, and τmed is that for Medicare. On the other hand, income tax covers
government expenditure G, Medicaid qd and the subsidy for employer-based health insurance ψpe.
I choose the progressive tax function from Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which has been widely
used in the macroeconomic policy literature. The income tax function T (y) is given by
T (y) = a0{y − (y
−a1 + a2)
−1/a1}+ τyy (12)
where y is taxable income. a0 denotes the upper bound of the progressive tax as income y goes to
infinity. a1 determines the curvature of the progressive tax function, and a2 is a scale parameter.
To use Gouveia and Strauss’s (1994) estimation result, I take their estimates in a0 and a1. a2 is
calibrated to match a target that is the fraction of total revenues financed by progressive income tax,
10Chapter 7 covers 70 percent of household bankruptcies. The other type of household bankruptcy is Chapter 13,
which I do not address here.
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which is 65 percent (OECD Revenue Statistics 2002). τy is chosen to balance the total government
budget.
2.1.2 Dynamic Household Problems
Households experience two phases of the life-cycle: working and retirement. For each period,
households have either good or bad credit history. Good credit history means that the household
has a record for a bankruptcy filing in its recent credit history. Bad credit history implies that the
household has no such record. Here, I focus on explaining the choice problem of working-age
households with good credit history because their choice problem is so informative as to under-
stand decisions all the other types of households can make. Appendix C describes all types of the
dynamic household problems in recursive form.
(a, i, h)
Assets,
health insurance,
health capital
are given
t
(ǫe,me(ǫe), ǫn, ζ, η, ω)
ER health shocks, ER expenses,
non-ER health shocks,
non-medical expenditure shocks,
labor earnings shocks
and the offer of EHI realize
t+ 1
t+ 1
Non-Defaulters
Defaulters
Good Credit History
Bad Credit History
choose consumption,
non-ER medical expenditures,
the purchase of health insurance
and saving or borrowing
choose consumption
non-ER medical expenditures
and the purchase of health insurance
(c,mn, i
′
, a
′
)
(c,mn, i
′
)
Non-defaulters
pay back financial debt, a < 0
and ER bill,me(ǫe).
Defaulters do not pay back
financial debt, a < 0
and ER bill,me(ǫe).
Figure 2: Time-line of Events for Working-age Households with a Good Credit History
Figure 2 shows the time-line of events for working-age households with a good credit history.
Each period consists of two sub-periods. At the beginning of sub-period 1, assets a, health insur-
ance status i and stock of health capital h are given from the previous period. Then, emergency
health shocks ǫe, non-emergency health shocks ǫn, non-medical expenditure shocks ζ , uninsurable
idiosyncratic shocks to the efficient units of labor η and an offer of employer-based health insur-
ance ω are realized. These health shocks affect households’ utility, labor productivity and mortal-
ity. Emergency health shocks ǫe incur specific sizes of non-discretionary medical costs me(ǫe).
11
11This setting means that the amount of emergency medical costs is independent of households’ income. This setting
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Non-medical expenditure shocks ζ capture all possible reasons for filing for bankruptcy other than
medical bills and bad luck in the labor market.12 ζ follows a uniform distribution of U [0, ζ¯].
Let V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) denote the value of working-age households with a good credit
history in sub-period 1. They solve
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
G,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω), v
G,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (13)
where vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) is the value of non-defaulting with good credit history and
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) is the value of defaulting with a good credit history. The defaulting value,
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω), does not depend on the current assets, a, and non-medical expenditure
shocks, ζ , because all debts are eliminated with the default decision.
In sub-period 2, the available choices differ with default decision in sub-period 1. Non-
defaulting working-age households with a good credit history at age j in age group jg solve
vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max
{c, a
′
, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ
′
e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(14)
such that
c+ q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)a
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a+ κ
− (1− qni )mn − (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
the feasible set of health insurance choice i follows (10) , and
the health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg) follows (11).
is supported by evidence in micro data. Using data from the MEPS, I find that, conditional on the use of emergency
rooms, the amount of emergency room charges is unrelated to households’ income. Further details are presented in
Appendix A.
12Although medical expenses and shocks from the labor market are the main driving forces of bankruptcy, other mo-
tives also play a role. For example, Chakravarty and Rhee (1999); Chatterjee et al. (2007) note that marital disruption
and lawsuits/harassment are also important factors to account for individuals’ bankruptcy filing decision.
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Non-defaulting working-age households with a good credit history make decisions on consumption
c, saving or debt a
′
, the purchase of health insurance for the next period i
′
and non-emergency
medical expenditures mn. They earn labor income wω¯jh
φh
c η and accidental bequest κ. They pay
out-of-pocket medical costs, the amount of which differs based on insurance status. If a household
purchased health insurance in the previous period, the insurance company covers a part of its
medical expenditure, qni mn+q
e
ime(ǫe)where q
n
i (q
e
i ) is the fraction of non-emergency (emergency)
medical expenditure health insurance i covers.13 The rest of the medical expense is the household’s
out-of-pocket medical expenditure, (1− qni )mn+(1− q
e
i )me(ǫe). If a household did not purchase
health insurance in the previous period, the total medical expenditure is the same as the household’s
out-of-pocket medical expenditure, qni = q
e
i = 0. They also pay costs incurred by non-medical
expenditure shocks, ζ , which follows a uniform distribution of U [0, ζ¯] . These households pay a
progressive tax T (·) based on their income y. They preserve their good credit history to the next
period.
Health insurance plays both roles. First, health insurance decreases the marginal cost of invest-
ing in health capital by reducing the out-of-pocket medical expenses for non-emergency treatment.
Second, health insurance partially insures the risk of emergency medical expense shocks. Since
physical capital a can also play the same roles, how the relative price of health capital h to phys-
ical capital a changes is a key to determining the allocation of these two types of capital. Health
insurance policies alter this relative price. If a health insurance policy subsidizes the purchase of
health insurance to poor households, they face a lower relative price of health capital h to physi-
cal capital a than rich households and decide to increase their medical spending. This individual
change in medical spending behavior results in a reallocation of health h and physical capital a
over households.
13The fraction of medical expenses covered by health insurance differs between emergency and non-emergency
treatments. According to the MEPS, the coverage rates of health insurances are larger for the case of emergency
medical treatments. More details are described in Section 3 (calibration).
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Defaulting working-age households with a good credit history at age j in age group jg solve
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(15)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− q
n
i )mn − T (y) + κ
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = wωjh
φh
c η
the feasible set of health insurance choice i follows (10) , and
the health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg) follows (11).
Defaulting working-age households with a good credit history make decisions on consumption c,
health insurance i
′
for the next period and non-emergency medical expenditures mn, but they can
neither save nor dis-save in this period, a
′
= 0. As non-defaulting households do, the out-of-
pocket medical expenses depend on their health insurance status. However, contrary to the case
of non-defaulting households, these households do not repay emergency medical expensesme(ǫe)
because they have an exemption. They also have exemptions from the unsecured financial debt
a < 0 and costs incurred by non-medical expenditure shocks ζ . The exemptions from those debts
are given at the cost of their credit record. Their credit history will become bad in the next period.
Although a majority of the decision-making problems of working-age households with bad
credit history are nearly identical to those of non-default households with good credit history, there
are a few differences. Non-defaulters with a bad credit history are not allowed to borrow, a ≥ 0,
and pay a pecuniary cost of having a bad credit history equal to some fraction of their earnings,
ξwω¯jh
φh
c η. In addition, their credit history is randomly determined in the next period. Defaulters
with bad credit history pay a pecuniary cost of having a bad credit history equal to some fraction
of their earnings, ξwω¯jh
φh
c η. They can neither save nor dis-save, a
′
= 0, and they make decisions
on consumption c, health insurance for the next period i
′
and non-emergency medical expenditures
mn. Defaulters with bad credit history also do not repay emergency medical costs ǫe and non-
medical expenses ζ , so (1−qni )mn becomes their out-of-pocket medical cost.
14 They maintain bad
credit history in the next period.
14They do not have any debt via the financial sector, as those with bad credit cannot borrow regardless of their
default decision.
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It is worth noting the difference between filing for bankruptcy and defaulting. The bankruptcy
system of this model is to capture the features of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S. Since
refilling bankruptcy is not allowed on average for ten years in the U.S., I assume that only those
who have a good credit history can file for bankruptcy. However, this does not mean those who
have a bad credit history cannot default on debts. Households with a bad credit history are allowed
to default on non-financial debts such as ER bills and costs from divorce.
Retired households do not have any labor income but receive Social Security benefits. Bor-
rowing is not allowed for them, a
′
≥ 0. I assume that all retired households have Medicare and
do not use any private health insurance. At the beginning of each period, retired households face
non-medical expenditure shocks ζ , emergency health shocks ǫe, and non-emergency health shocks
ǫn. They make decisions on consumption c, saving or debt a
′
, and non-emergency medical expen-
dituresmn. They pay out-of-pocket medical costs, (1− q
n
med)mn + (1− q
e
med)me(ǫe).
2.2 Firm
The economy has a representative firm. The firm maximizes its profit by solving the following
problem:
max
K,N
{zF (K,N)− wN − rK} (16)
where z is the total factor productivity (TFP), K is the aggregate capital stock, N is aggregate labor,
and r is the capital rental rate.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
There are competitive financial intermediaries, and loans are defined by each state. This system
implies that with the law of large numbers, ex post-realized profits of lenders are zero for each type
of loan. The lenders can observe the state of each borrower, and the price of loans is determined
using good credit-status households’ default probability and the risk-free interest rate.15
Specifically, the default probability of a household with a good credit history G, total debt
a
′
, insurance purchase status i
′
, health capital for the next period h
′
, current age j and current
idiosyncratic earnings shock η in the next period is given by
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) = (17)∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′
,ω
′
,ζ
′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′πζ′1{vG,N (a′ ,i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′
,ω
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(i
′
,h
′
,ǫ
′
e,ǫ
′
n,η
′
,ω
′
,j+1)}
15Note that households with a bad credit history cannot access the financial market.
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where πǫ′e|h
′ is the probability of an emergency health shock ǫ
′
e in the next period conditional on
health capital h
′
for the next period, πǫ′n|h
′ is the probability of a non-emergency health shock
ǫn in the next period conditional on health capital h
′
for the next period, πη′ |η is the transitional
probability of idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η
′
in the next period conditional on the current
idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η, and πω′ |η′ is the probability of the offer of employer-based
health insurance in the next period conditional on the idiosyncratic shock to earnings η
′
in the next
period.
The zero-profit condition of the financial intermediaries that make a loan of amount a
′
to house-
holds with age j, current idiosyncratic labor productivity η, health capital h
′
for the next period,
and health insurance i
′
for the next period is given by
(1 + rrf ) q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) a
′
= (1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)) a
′
(18)
where rrf is the risk-free interest rate and q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is the discount rate of the loan price.16
Then, the discount rate of the loan price q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)
1 + rrf
. (19)
2.4 Hospital
The economy has a representative agent hospital. For convenience, I denote household state s as
(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) and credit history as υ ∈ {G,B}; the hospital earns the following revenue:
mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j)) me(ǫe) + gd(s, j) max (a, 0) (20)
wheremn(s, j) is the decision rule for non-emergency medical expenditures for households of state
s at age j. me(ǫe) is emergency medical expenses for emergency health shocks ǫe, and gd(s, j) is
the decision rule for defaulting for households of state s at age j. All households always pay
non-emergency medical expenditures mn, regardless of whether they default, as the hospital can
assess patients’ financial abilities before providing non-emergency medical treatment. However,
the payment amount for emergency medical treatments me(ǫe) depends on individual default de-
cisions. This is because the EMTALA requires hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment
regardless of whether the patients can pay their emergency medical bills. Non-defaulters repay all
of their emergency medical expenditures to the hospital, but defaulters provide their assets instead
16Financial intermediaries consider both households’ health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
for the next period
to price loans. This assumption is necessary to solve the model, as no pooling equilibrium exists under symmetric
information between lenders and borrowers. Solving default models under asymmetric information is beyond the
scope of this paper.
19
of paying emergency medical expenses. If the asset level of these individuals is below 0 (debt), the
hospital receives no payment.
For each period t, hospital profits are given by
J¯∑
j=J0
∫
{[mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j))me(ǫe) + gd(s, j) max (a, 0)] (21)
−
(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))
ζ
}µ(ds, j)
where ζ is the mark-up of the hospital, and µ(s, j) is the measure of households at age j of state s.
Following Chatterjee et al. (2007), mark-up ζ is adjusted to ensure zero profits in equilibrium.17
Note that the mark-up of the hospital ζ is an instrument through which I can evaluate the
efficiency of healthcare policies in terms of healthcare providers, because the size of the hospital’s
mark-up ζ increases with unpaid medical debt.
2.5 Equilibrium
Appendix E defines a recursive competitive equilibrium.
2.6 Numerical Solution Algorithm
Here, I describe the key ideas of the numerical solution algorithm. Appendix G demonstrates each
step of the algorithm with details.
Substantial computational burdens are involved in solving the model. The model has a large
number of individual state variables, and loan prices depend on the state of individuals due to the
endogenous default setting. Moreover, the model has many parameters that must be adjusted to
match cross-sectional and life-cycle moments in the model with those in the data.
To solve the model, I apply an endogenous grid method to the variable of asset holdings a
′
for the next period and discretize the variables of health capital h
′
for the next period and health
insurance i
′
for the next period because the variation of asset holdings a
′
is the largest among
endogenous state variables. The endogenous grid method I use is an extension of Fella’s (2014)
method. Fella (2014) develops an endogenous grid method to solve models with discrete choices
under an exogenous borrowing limit. One of the main contributions of Fella (2014) is an algo-
rithm identifying concave regions over the solution set, to which Carroll’s (2006) endogenous grid
method is applicable. However, Fella’s (2014) endogenous grid method is not directly applica-
ble to models with default options, as these models do not have any predetermined feasible set
17Note that the object of default is here only emergency medical expenditures, while that in Chatterjee et al. (2007)
is all medical expenditures.
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of solutions. Based on the theoretical findings of Arellano (2008); Clausen and Strub (2017), I
add a numerical procedure for finding the lower bound of feasible sets for the solution to Fella’s
(2014) algorithm that identifies concave regions over the solution sets, which allows me to use the
endogenous grid method to solve this model.
Definition 2.6.1. For each (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), a
′
rbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) is the risky borrowing limit if
∀a
′
≥ a
′
rbl(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η),
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
=
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
∂a′
a
′
+ q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) > 0.
I numerically compute the risky borrowing limit for each state and take it as the lower bound
of feasible sets for solution a
′
. To use the endogenous grid method, a first-order condition (FOC)
is required. The following proposition guarantees the existence of an FOC and provides the form
of the FOC, which is needed to use the endogenous grid method.
Proposition 2.6.1. Given a pair of (ǫe, ǫn), for any (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, j, η) and for any a
′
≥ a
′
rbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η),
(i) the FOC of asset holdings a
′
exists, and
(ii) the FOC is as follows:
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
∂u(c, (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h¯)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j + 1)
∂a′
(22)
whereWG is the expected value of working-age households with a good history.
Proof. See Appendix D.
For each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
for the next period, endogenous grid methods
computes the endogenously-driven current assets a(a
′
) by using the FOC in Proposition 2.6.1.
Note that since the endogenously-driven current assets a(a
′
) is located on an endogenous grid of
the current assets a, the decision rule and values on the exogenous grid must also be computed.
The monotonicity of decision rules and value functions allows endogenous grid methods to use
interpolations to compute those on the exogenous grid for the current assets a.
I modify this interpolation step as follows. For each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
of which value is above zero, I use a linear interpolation as other endogenous grid methods do.
However, for each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
whose value is below zero, I use the grid
search method to avoid potentially unstable solutions due to numerical errors in calculating the
derivative of loan rate schedules
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a
′ . Although Proposition 2.6.1 proves that these loan
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rate schedules are differentiable, as Hatchondo et al. (2010) noted, the accuracy of the solution
is sensitive to the method used to compute the derivative of loan rate schedules
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a′
. I
use the grid search method only for asset holdings a
′
of which value is below zero. Despite the
inclusion of this grid search method, this hybrid method substantially reduces computational time
because the method does not search the whole range of the assets grid. This grid search is operated
only between the risky borrowing limit and zero assets. Moreover, using the monotonicity, I can
repeatedly narrow the range of the feasible set of solutions in grid search.
3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to capture cross-sectional and life-cycle features of the U.S. economy before
the ACA, because the period of the ACA is too brief to be considered as the steady state of the U.S.
healthcare system. To reflect these features, I take information from multiple micro data sets. In
particular, I use the MEPS to capture salient cross-sectional and life-cycle dimensions on the use
of emergency rooms, medical conditions, and medical expenditures.18
To calibrate the model, I separate parameters into two groups. The first set of parameters is
determined outside the model. I choose the values of these parameters from the macroeconomic
literature and policies. The other set of parameters requires solving the stationary distribution of
the model to minimize the distance between moments generated by the model and their empirical
counterparts. Table 1 shows the values of parameters resulting from the calibration, Table 2 sum-
marizes the targeted aggregate moments and the corresponding moments generated by the model,
and Figure 3 shows the targeted life-cycle moments and the corresponding model-generated mo-
ments.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Description Internal Value
Demographics
J0 Initial age N 23
Jr Retirement age N 65
J¯ Maximum length of life N 100
πn Population growth rate (percent) N 1.2%
Preferences
λu Weight on consumption Y 0.604
v Elasticity of substitution b.w c and hc Y 0.54
σ Risk aversion N 3 (De Nardi et al. (2010))
β Discount factor Y 0.7659
18The details of the data selection process are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Parameter Description Internal Value
Bu Constant in the utility Y 3004.29
Labor Income
ω¯j Deterministic life-cycle profile N {0.0905,-0.0016}
∗
φh Elasticity of labor income to health status N 0.594
ρη Persistence of labor productivity shocks Y 0.851
σǫ Standard deviation of persistent shocks Y 0.579
Health Technology
κe Scale of ER health shocks Y 0.309
Ajg Age group effect on ER health shocks Y {1, 1.330, 1.494, 1.586, 1.266, 1.037}
pse Probability of drastic ER health shocks N 0.2
κn Scale of non-ER health shocks Y 0.019
αn Dispersion of non-ER health shocks Y 0.543
Bjg Age group effect of non-ER health shock Y {1, 0.711, 0.459, 0.295, 0.172, 0.012}
ψjg Efficiency of health technology Y {0.440, 0.427, 0.503, 0.587, 0.670, 0.639}
ϕjg Curvature of health technology Y {0.286, 0.205, 0.260, 0.264, 0.275, 0.4}
Survival Probability
Γjg Age group effect on survival rate Y {0.004, 0.01, 0.02, 0.026, 0.112, 0.297, 0.605}
ν Elasticity of survival rate to health status N 0.226 (Franks et al. (2003))
Health Insurance
y¯ Income threshold for Medicaid eligibility Y 0.048
(qnMCD, q
e
MCD) Medicaid coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnIHI , q
e
IHI) IHI coverage rates N (0.55,0.7)
(qnEHI , q
e
EHI) EHI coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnmed, q
e
med) Medicare coverage rates N (0.55,0.75)
pmed Medicaid premium N 0.021
p(EHI|η) EHI offer rate N Appendix H
ψEHI Subsidy for EHI N 0.8
ξIHI Markup for IHI Y 1
ξEHI Markup for EHI Y 1
Default
ξ Cost of having a bad credit history Y 0.55
λ 1/Duration of having a bad credit history N 0.333
ζ¯ Non-medical expense shocks ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯] Y 0.052
Tax and Government
ss Social Security benefit N 0.256
τss Social Security tax Y 0.08
τmed Medicare payroll tax Y 0.053
G Government spending/ GDP N 0.18
a0 Upper bound of the progressive tax fnc N 0.258 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a1 Curvature of the progressive tax fnc N 0.768 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a2 Scale of the progressive tax fnc Y 1.31
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Parameter Description Internal Value
τy Proportional tax rate Y 0.098
Firm
z Total factor productivity Y 0.557
θ Capital income share N 0.36
δ Depreciation rate N 0.24
Hospital
ζ Mark-up of hospital Y 1.039
The model period is triennial . One unit of output in the model is the U.S. GDP per capita in
2000 ($36, 245.5).
Table 2: Targeted Aggregate Moments
Moment Empirical value Model value
Risk-free interest rate (percent) 4 4
AVG of bankruptcy rates (percent) 1.122 1.128
Fraction of bankruptcy Filers with Medical Bills 0.62 0.63
Total medical expenditures/GDP 0.163 0.167
CV of medical expenditures 2.7 2.52
Corr b.w. consumption and medical expenditures 0.158 0.158
Autocorrelation of earnings shocks 0.952 0.952
STD of log earnings 1.29 1.292
Fraction of ER users aged b.w. 23 and 34 0.125 0.126
AVG of health shocks b.w. ages of 23 and 34 0.116 0.121
Individual health insurance take-up ratio 0.11 0.106
Employer-based health insurance take-up ratio 0.685 0.669
Working-age households’ Medicaid take-up ratio 0.044 0.044
The model period is triennial . I transform triennial moments into annual moments.
One unit of output in the model is the U.S. GDP per capita in 2000 ($36, 432.5).
Demographics: The model period is triennial. Households enter the economy at age 23 and
retire at age 65. Since the mortality rate is endogenous, life spans differ across households. Their
maximum length of life is 100 years. These values correspond to Jr = 15 and J¯ = 26. The chosen
population growth rate πn is 1.2 percent, which is consistent with the annual population growth
rate in the U.S.
Preferences: Preferences are represented by a power utility function over a CES aggregator over
consumption and health status. λu is the weight of non-medical consumption on the CES aggre-
gator in the utility function. λu is chosen to match the ratio of the total medical expenditures to
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Figure 3: Targeted Life-cycle Moments
output of 0.163 in the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA). v is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between non-medical consumption and current health status, which is chosen to target
the correlation between non-medical consumption and medical expenditures, which is 0.158 in the
PSID. The value of v is 0.54, which implies that consumption is complementary with health. This
result is consistent with the empirical findings of Finkelstein et al. (2013). σ is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, according to De Nardi et al. (2010). β is the discount factor of households,
which is selected to match an equilibrium risk-free interest rate of 4 percent. Following Hall and
Jones (2007), Bu is chosen to guarantee the positive value of life. Its value is larger than usual
values in the literature to prevent negative values of living in extremely bad cases. For example,
if a household pays a pecuniary cost of having a bad credit history and experiences extremely bad
health events with bad luck in the labor market, its life value can be positive only when Bu is
substantially large.
Labor Income: To obtain the deterministic life-cycle profile of earnings ω¯j , I take the follow-
ing steps. First, in the MEPS, I choose the Physical Component Score (PCS) as the counterpart
of health status in the model.19 I normalize the PCS by dividing all of the observations by the
highest score in the sample. Second, exploiting the panel structure of the MEPS data, I regress
the difference in log labor income on differences in age squared, education, sex and the PCS.20 I
19The PCS is a continuous health measure between 0 and 100 that indicates individual physical condition.
20This setting absorbs individual fixed effects. Further, one might be concerned about endogeneity due to reverse
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choose the summation of the age and age-squared terms as the deterministic life-cycle profiles of
earnings ω¯j . φh is set based on the estimate of the coefficient of the PCS. ρη is chosen to match
the autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic component φh log (hc)+ log (η) with the autocorrelation of
earnings shocks without the health component of 0.957 in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).
σǫ is chosen such that the model generates a standard deviation of 1.29 for the log earnings (labor
income) in the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) (Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover and Rı´os-Rull (2011)).
Health Technology: I choose the scale parameter of the function for emergency health shocks κe
to target the average fraction of emergency room users aged between 23 and 34, which is 0.125 in
the MEPS. Ag governs differences in emergency room visits by age group. It is chosen to match
the ratio of the fraction of emergency room visits for each age group to that of households aged
between 23 and 34. The upper-right panel of Figure 3 shows that these ratios observed in data are
close to those generated by the model. pse is the probability of an extreme emergency medical event
conditional on the occurrence of an emergency medical event. I model these extreme emergency
medical events as emergency events that incur the top 20 percent of emergency medical expenses.
κn is chosen to target the average health shocks of households aged between 23 and 34, which
is 0.125 in the MEPS. αn determines the degree of differences in health shocks across levels of
health capital. It is selected to target the coefficient of variation of medical expenditures of 2.67
in the MEPS. Bjg is set to match the ratio of the average of medical conditions transformed by
health shocks for each age group to that of households aged between 23 and 34. The lower-left
panel of Figure 3 shows that the model generates a similar age profile of medical conditions. ψjg
is set to match the average of medical expenditures for each age group. ϕjg is chosen to target the
standard deviation of medical expenditures for each age group. The upper-left and upper-middle
panels of Figure 3 show that the life-cycle profiles of the mean and standard deviation for medical
expenditures in the data are close to those generated by the model.
Survival Probability: Γjg controls the disparities in survival rates across age groups. Γjg is cho-
sen to target the average survival rate for each age group, which is calculated based on Bell and
Miller (2005). ν governs the predictability of the PCS for the survival rate. I choose ν based on
the estimate of Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003). They use a somewhat different type of health
measure from the MEPS. Whereas the MEPS uses the SF-12 as its PCS, Franks, Gold and Fiscella
(2003) choose the SF-5 as their PCS. Although the types of PCS differ, Østhus, Preljevic, Sandvik,
Leivestad, Nordhus, Dammen and Os (2012); Lacson, Xu, Lin, Dean, Lazarus and Hakim (2010);
Rumsfeld, MaWhinney, McCarthy Jr, Shroyer, VillaNueva, O’brien, Moritz, Henderson, Grover,
Sethi et al. (1999) find that different types of PCS are highly correlated. Based on their finding,
causality from labor income to health, but empirical studies including Currie and Madrian (1999) and Deaton (2003)
show that it is difficult to find a direct effect of labor income on health.
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I use the estimate of Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003) by transforming their five-year result to a
three-year value and rescaling the 0-100 scale into the relative scale of the model. Recall that, in
the model, health status is represented by a health status relative to the healthiest in the economy.
Health Insurance: The income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯ is chosen to match the per-
centage of Medicaid takers among working-age households, which is 4.4 percent in the MEPS.
Health insurance coverage rates, qeMCD, q
e
IHI , q
e
EHI and q
e
med, (q
n
MCD, q
n
IHI , q
n
EHI and q
n
med), are
chosen to match the fraction of (non-) emergency out-of-pocket medical expenditures among the
total medical expenditures for each type of health insurance. The Medicare premium pmed is set to
2.11 percent of GDP per capita, which is based on the finding in Jeske and Kitao (2009). The offer
rates of employer-based health insurance p(EHI|η) are set to target the offer rates across earnings
levels in the MEPS. Appendix H demonstrates the details. For each age group jg, I calculate the
conditional offer rates given a level of earnings in the data. Then, I map the offer rate in the data
onto the stationary distribution of earnings shocks in the model and calculate the conditional offer
rate p(EHI|η). I use not the level of earnings but the persistent part of earnings shocks because the
latter captures more features of employers. The subsidy for employer-based health insurance ψEHI
is chosen such that employer-based health insurance takers pay 20 percent of the premium. ξIHI
and ξEHI are set to the take-up ratios of individual private health insurance and employer-based
health insurance, respectively.
Default: The cost of bad credit history ξ is chosen to match the average Chapter 7 bankruptcy rate
in Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2019). λ is chosen to match the average duration of exclusion, which
is 10 years for Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing.
Tax and Government: ss is chosen to match a replacement rate of 40 percent. Social Security
tax τss is chosen to balance the government budget for Social Security. τmed is set to balance the
government budget for Medicare. Non-medical government spending is set at 18 percent of U.S.
GDP. a0 and a1 are taken from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). As in Jeske and Kitao (2009) and
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013), the scale parameter of the income tax function a2 is chosen
to match the fraction of tax revenue financed by progressive income taxation of 65 percent, which
is the average value of the OECD member countries. The proportional income tax τy is chosen to
balance the government budget constraint.
Firm: TFP z is chosen to normalize output to 1. θ is chosen to reproduce the empirical finding
that the share of capital income is 0.36. Annual depreciation rate δ is 8 percent.
Hospital: Following Chatterjee et al. (2007), hospital mark-up ζ is chosen to represent the zero
profit condition of the hospital.
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3.1 Model Performance
Before conducting a series of counterfactual experiments for the three healthcare reforms, I demon-
strate the performance of the model by assessing the consistency of the untargeted results of the
model with their empirical counterparts.
Life-cycle Dimensions: Figure 4 depicts the life-cycle profiles of average consumption, earnings
and assets. The shape of the consumption profile is concave and relatively flatter than the other
two profiles. Earnings profiles increase until the mid-40s and decline until retirement. After retire-
ment, households receive Social Security benefits. Households save assets until their retirements
and spend them afterward. The shape of the three profiles resembles that of their empirical coun-
terparts, which are documented in Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) and Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover
and Rı´os-Rull (2011).
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Figure 4: Age Profiles of Consumption, Earnings and Assets
23-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Age
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Pe
rce
nta
ge
Data
Model
Figure 5: Age Profiles of Bankruptcy Filings (Source: Sullivan et al. (2001))
Figure 5 displays the profiles of the fraction of bankruptcy filings over the life-cycle. In the
data, the life-cycle profile of bankruptcy filings is hump-shaped, and bankruptcy filers aged be-
tween 25 and 44 consist of more than half of the total bankruptcy filers. The model broadly
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reproduces these features well, meaning that it successfully reflects how default risks evolve over
the life-cycle.
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Figure 6: Age Profiles of Insurance Take-up Ratios
Figure 6 shows the age profiles of take-up ratios for health insurance. These take-up ratios in
the model are broadly similar to those in the data. Before the expansion of Medicaid under the
ACA, only a small portion of working-age households used Medicaid, as it was available only
to low-income households. The model generates this feature well. Regarding individual health
insurance, the model reproduces the life-cycle profile for those aged between 23 and 55 well.
However, the model does not match the empirical rise in its take-up ratio for those aged between
56 and 64 because the model cannot capture early retirement. In the data, those who take early
retirement tend to purchase individual health insurance until they reach the Medicare eligibility
age. Since all households in the model are required to retire at age 65, the model fails to reproduce
this. The model succeeds in generating the hump-shaped age profiles in employer-based health
insurance in the data, which implies that the model, overall, reflects life-cycle features of health
insurance behavior well .
Cross-sectional Dimensions: Table 3 shows cross-sectional moments that are not explicitly tar-
geted. The empirical values of these moments are obtained from previous studies and the data. The
empirical value for the debt-to-earnings ratio is from Livshits et al. (2007). The debt to earnings
ratio is 0.084 in the data and 0.099 in the model. The fraction of uncompensated ER is computed
by counting households whose total ER expenditure is less than 50 percent of the total charge
of ER in the MEPS. The fraction is 0.502 in the data, and 0.469 in the model. The model also
generates reasonable values on health-related cross-sectional moments. The empirical values of
these health-related moments below are from the MEPS. The model generates negative values of
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Table 3: Untargeted Cross-sectional Moments
Moment Empirical Value Model Value
Debt - Earnings Ratio 0.084 0.099
Fraction of Uncompensated ER 0.502 0.469
Correlation b.w. Income and ER Visits -0.09 -0.12
Correlation b.w. Income and Medical Conditions -0.15 -0.24
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments into annual mo-
ments.
the correlation between income and emergency room visits and of the correlation between income
and medical conditions quantified to health shocks. Note that the negative correlation values can
be reproduced owing to the model’s setting for the distribution of health shocks: the likelihood of
emergency and non-emergency health shocks negatively depends on health capital.
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Figure 7: Bottom and Top End of the Emergency Room Usage Distribution
Figure 7 implies that the model endogenously captures the features of emergency room usage
of low-income individuals and high-income individuals. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that,
in the data, low-income individuals visit emergency rooms more frequently over the life-cycle,
which is well-replicated in the model. Note that the fraction differs across income levels, as the
distribution of emergency health shocks depends on health capital. If the distribution depended
only on age, there would be no difference in visits to emergency rooms across income groups.
Figure 8 compares the age profiles of medical conditions between individuals in the top 20
percent of income and those in the bottom 20 percent. It implies that the model captures the distri-
butional features of medical conditions across income groups. The left panel of Figure 8 implies
that low-income individuals tend to suffer from more severe health shocks than high-income indi-
viduals, which is presented in the model’s result. These successes of the model make it possible
to capture asymmetric financial risks across income groups, as health risks are linked to financial
risks via emergency and non-emergency medical expenses.
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Figure 8: Bottom and Top End of the Medical Conditions Distribution
4 Results
In this section, I investigate the effects of the option to default on the optimal health insurance
policy. To do so, I take the following steps. First, following the literature, I turn off the option
to default by imposing an extremely large penalty on defaulting. Specifically, I restrict defaulting
households to have no labor income and to get by with the small amount of accidental bequest
until their credit history recovers to good.21 In this setting, households default only when their
budget set for non-defaulting is the empty set. Second, I compare the economy with the option to
default to that without the option to default. Third, I define the function of the health insurance
system and the social welfare function. Fourth, I use these functions to find both the optimal health
insurance policy in the economies with and without the option to default. Finally, I compare these
optimal health insurance policies. Note that in the economy without the option to default, there is
no borrowing because the level of the natural borrowing limit is zero with an endogenous survival
rate.
4.1 The Effect of the Option to Default on the Economy with the Baseline
Health Insurance System
’Health Insurance’ in Table 4 implies that the option to default acts as implicit health insurance
by leading households to be reluctant to purchase health insurance, as noted in Mahoney (2015).
When the option to default is unavailable, the total insurance take-up ratio increases by 6.5%. This
increase is driven by households who demand further private health insurance. The take-up ratio of
Medicaid shows little change due to its invariant rule for income eligibility, while the take-up ratios
of IHI and EHI increase by 2.7 and 3.6 percent, respectively. Figure 9 implies that the phase of
21This setting implies an annual income of approximately 1240 dollars, and this restriction lasts 10 years on average.
A small income is required to maintain a positive value of life. Additionally, one might consider not allowing the option
to default mechanically without any penalty. This setting is not feasible because the monotonicity of the expected value
function does not hold around the default region.
31
Table 4: The Effect of the Option to Default on Health-related Outcomes
Moment w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Health Insurance
Total Insurance Take-up Ratio 81.9% 88.4%
Medicaid Take-up Ratio 4.4% 4.5%
IHI Take-up Ratio 10.6% 13.3%
EHI Take-up Ratio 66.9% 70.5%
AVG IHI Eff. Price* 1348 1293
AVG EHI Eff. Price* 696 697
Medical Expenditure
AVG Medical Exp.* 6091 6228
CV of Medical Exp. 2.52 2.48
Health Measure
AVG Health 0.707 0.700
STD of Log Health 0.769 0.797
AVG Health Shocks 0.346 0.349
AVG Prob of ER Visits 0.124 0.127
Life Expectancy 74.20 74.20
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments
into annual moments.
* Unit=U.S. dollar in 2000.
changes in health insurance differs across age groups. Households in the 20s-30s tend to purchase
more IHI, while households in the 40s-50s choose more EHI. This difference occurs because all
working-age households increase their demand for health insurance due to the lack of the option
to default, while the offer rate of EHI is relatively low for young-age groups.22
’Medical Expenditure’ in Table 4 implies that eliminating the option to default causes spending
on health to increase and to be more equal. Insulating the option to default increases the average
medical expenditure by 2.2 percent and reduces the coefficient of variation for medical expendi-
tures by 1.6 percent. The upper panels of Figure 10 indicate that the option to default results in
substantial differences in medical spending behavior over the life-cycle. When the option to default
is unavailable, households reduce medical spending substantially in their 20s and rapidly increase
spending from their 30s onward. Eliminating the option to default leads households to spend on
health more equally over the life-cycle.
These disparities in medical spending behavior are driven by the availability of access to credit.
With the option to default, households have access to credit, which helps households smooth their
medical spending through borrowing. The top-right panel of Figure 11 shows that households in
the 10th percentile of net worth make substantial loans in the economy with the option to default
during the working-age period, while those without the option to default are stuck at the borrowing
limit.23 When the option to default is available, even households in the 35th percentile of net worth
22Appendix H shows the details.
23Recall that without the option to default, households cannot borrow because the natural borrowing limit is zero
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Figure 9: The Effect of the Option to Default on Health Insurance
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Figure 10: Changes in Medical Expenditure and Health from the Economy with the Option to
Default to that without the Option to Default
rely on debts in their early phase of the life-cycle. When the option to default is unavailable, these
with an endogenous survival rate.
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Figure 11: The Effect of the Option to Default on Net Worth
households start accumulating assets from a very early phase of their life-cycle because they have
to insure against health risks only via savings and health insurance. Compared to households in
the economy with the option to default, households without the option to default spend less on
health in their 20s and more on from their 30s onward because they do not manage to accumulate
sufficient assets in the early phase. The option to default has little impact on the evolution of wealth
for the rich because they are less likely to encounter the browning constraint regardless of whether
the option to default is available. Inequality in medical spending is smaller in the case without
the option to default. These households are more cautious in managing health because poor health
would otherwise come at a substantial financial burdens over the life-cycle due to the lack of the
option to default.
These differences in medical spending behavior induce differences in the evolution of health.
’Heath Measure’ in Table 4 shows that the option to default reduces average health status while
increasing inequality in health. The option to default reduces average health by 1 percent and
increases the standard deviation of the log of health status by 3.6 percent. The average health
shock and the average probability of ER visits are also larger in the economy without the option to
default. The lower panels of Figure 10 indicate that the option to default yields substantially large
differences in the evolution of health over the life-cycle. When the option to default is unavailable,
households in their 20s and middle 30s undergo a substantial reduction in average health because
they cannot spend on medical treatments against health shocks due to the lack of access to credit
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and insufficient assets. Households recover health from the late 30s onward by increasing medical
spending, of which the source is their assets. In turn, older households achieve slight improvements
in health. Insulating the option to default substantially increases the standard deviation of the log
of health status in the early phase of the life-cycle because a few young households face medical
events but cannot spend substantially on health due to their low income and the lack of access
to credit. The difference in inequality in health decreases because households have more time to
accumulate assets as they age.
Table 5: The Effect of the Option to Default on Aggregate Variables
Moment w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Y 1* 1.02
K/Y 2.96 3.11
Risk-free Int. Rate 4% 3.46%
AVG BOR. Int. Rate 18% -
Debt/Earnings 0.099 0
AVG B.K. Rate 1.128% 0.547%
Frac of B.K. with Med. Bills 0.64 0.81
Market Wage 0.254 0.261
Unit of Eff. Labor 2.52 2.5
STD of Log Earnings 1.29 1.31
AVG Cons 0.342 0.346
STD of Log Cons 0.917 1.024
AVG Tax Rate 22.1% 21.9%
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments
into annual moments.
* I normalize the output value in the benchmark model with the
option to default to 1.
Table 5 implies that the option to default has quantitatively substantial impacts on capital, labor
productivity, and consumption at the aggregate level. As noted in Figure 11, eliminating the option
to default causes households to increase their life-cycle saving due to the additional precautionary
motives. This increase in saving induces an increase in the capital-output ratio, thereby resulting in
a decrease in the risk-free interest rate and an increase in the market wage in general equilibrium.
When the option to default is unavailable, all bankruptcies are non-strategic and non-voluntary,
and the rate is 0.547 percent. Recall that, as noted in Figure 10, the absence of the option to
default deteriorates health and increases inequality in health for young households. These changes
in health decrease the average efficient unit of labor and increase the standard deviation of the log
of earnings. Figure 12 shows that the average levels of earnings are higher in the economy without
the option to default, although the overall level of health is lower. This gap occurs because general
equilibrium effects induce a higher level of wage in the economy without the option to default
due to such a large increase in the aggregate capital. These disparities in earnings induce different
evolution of consumption. Figure 12 implies that the increase in earnings leads to an increase in
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consumption, and more dispersed earnings give rise to an increase in inequality in consumption.
Insulating the option to default causes the consumption profile to be steeper because the lack of
access to credit hinders households from smoothing consumption over the life-cycle.
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Figure 12: The Effect of the Option to Default on Earnings and Consumption
4.2 Health Insurance Policy and Social Welfare Function
All health insurance policies in this study address the reforms of two types of health insurance
for non-retirees: Medicaid (public health insurance for non-retirees) and IHI. The ideal target is
to characterize a complete set of healthcare reforms that maximizes social welfare. However,
healthcare reforms in the U.S. include a large number of policy components that affect a wide
range of agents.24 I put my focus mainly on policy components related to households. In addition,
in all policy experiments going forward, I preserve the system of employer-based health insurance
in the baseline economy because healthcare reforms currently proposed in the U.S., such as the
ACA and the American Health Care Act (AHCA), have mainly focused on policies for Medicaid
and IHI.
Specifically, my goal is to find the optimal design of three objects: (i) the eligibility rule of
Medicaid, (ii) the subsidy rule for the purchase of IHI, and (iii) the reform of the IHI market on
its pricing rule, pIHI , and coverage rates, (q
e
IHI , q
n
IHI). Ideally, one would impose no restrictions
on the objects the government can select. Unfortunately, optimizing such unrestricted objects is
computationally unfeasible. Therefore, first, I represent (i) the eligibility rule for Medicaid and (ii)
the subsidy rule for the purchase of IHI in one function with a two-parameter family. The subsidy
24For example, policies in the Affordable Care Act reach the health insurance industry, household, firm and govern-
ment sectors.
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function of Medicaid and IHI is given by
Φ(y, i; M¯, ap) =


1 if y ≤ M¯ & i = MCD
− 1
ap
· y + 1
ap
· M¯ + 1 if M¯ < y ≤ M¯ + ap & i = IHI
0 otherwise
(23)
where Φ(y, i; M¯, ap) is the proportion of subsidy on the premium of health insurance i given to
households whose income is y. M¯ is the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, and ap is the
income threshold of the subsidy for the purchase of IHI. For example, if a household earns income
lower than the income eligibility of MedicaidM , this household can use Medicaid. If a household
is between M¯ and M¯ + ap, this household is not eligible for Medicaid, but it can receive a subsidy
for the purchase of IHI as much as a fraction −1/ap · y + 1/ap · M¯ + 1 of the health insurance
premium. Note that when ap increases, the subsidy covers more households with larger benefits.
I define the IHI market reform as follows:
Π(bp) = (pIHI , q
n
IHI , q
e
IHI) =

(pIHI(hc, jg), 0.55, 0.7) if bp = 0(pIHI(jg), 0.70, 0.8) if bp = 1 (24)
whereΠ(bp) is a vector of the pricing rule for IHI pIHI , the coverage rate for non-medical expenses
qnIHI , and that of emergency medical expenses q
e
IHI conditional on a reform of bp. bp = 0 implies
no reform in the IHI market. Thus, the premium of IHI depends on the current health status hc
as well as age group jg, and its coverage rates (q
n
IHI , q
E
IHI) are lower than those of Medicaid and
employer-based health insurance. bp = 1 implies that the premium depends only on age group
jg and that the coverage rates, (q
e
IHI , q
n
IHI), improve to be the same as the EHI and Medicaid’s
coverage rate.
The above setting is sufficiently flexible that the functions enable me to replicate not only
pre-existing healthcare systems around the world but also alternative healthcare reforms recently
proposed in the U.S. For example, if M¯ is larger than the income of a household whose income
is the highest, this policy implies a universal healthcare system (single-payer healthcare system).
Additionally, by choosing bp = 1 and adjusting M¯ and ap properly, it is possible to mimic the
Medicaid expansion and the progressive subsidies for the purchase of individual health insurance of
the ACA. Furthermore, if one chooses bp = 0 and establishes lower values of M¯ and ap than those
of the ACA, he can mimic the policies of the American Health Care Act. The parameterization of
healthcare reform permits us to avoid restricting the scope of this study to specific reforms. Rather,
this flexibility makes it possible to explore more general features of health insurance policies,
which allows the characterization of optimal health insurance policies.
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Healthcare reforms can be represented by three parameters (M¯, ap, bp). An issue is that differ-
ent healthcare reforms require different levels of tax revenues because the reforms are funded by
taxes. I adjust a0 of the income tax function , a0{y− (y
−a1 + a2)
−1/a1}+ τy y, to balance the gov-
ernment budget while preserving the values of a1, a2 and τy in the baseline economy. Recall that
a0 determines the upper bound of the progressive tax as income y goes to infinity. Therefore, the
higher a0, the more progressive the tax system. As noted in Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013),
this setting takes into account that more redistributive healthcare reforms require more progressive
income taxes.
The government maximizes a social welfare function (SWF). The SWF values the ex-ante
lifetime utility of an agent born into the stationary equilibrium implied by the chosen healthcare
reform. The government solves
max
M¯≥0,ap≥0,bp∈{0,1}
SWF (M¯, ap, bp) (25)
such that
SWF (M¯, ap, bp) =
∫
V Gj=23(s0; M¯, ap, bp)µ(ds0, j = 23; M¯, ap, bp)
s0 = (a = 0, i = i0, h = h0, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω)
(23) and (24).
where V Gj=23(·; M¯, ap, bp) is the value of households at age 23 associated with (M¯, ap, bp), µ(·; j =
23; M¯, ap, bp) is the distribution over households at age 23 associated with (M¯, ap, bp). Recall that
all newborn households start with zero assets and the maximum level of health capital stock. The
initial distribution of health insurance status is obtained from the MEPS by computing the joint
distribution between earnings and health insurance status at age 23. I interpret that the level of
earnings in the MEPS reflects the level of labor productivity η. I assume that (ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) are on
their stationary distributions at age 23.
I quantify welfare changes from the baseline economy by computing the consumption equiva-
lent variation CEV in the following way:
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,0(s, j))u((1 + CEV)c0(s, j), hc,0(s, j))µ0(ds, j) (26)
=
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,1(s, j))u(c1(s, j), hc,1(s, j))µ1(ds, j)
where β is the discount rate, and πj+1|j(hc) is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 conditional
survival up to age j with a current health status hc. The subscripts of these variables indicate
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the economy concerned. A subscript of 0 means that the variables refer to an economy with the
baseline health insurance system, and a subscript of 1 implies that the variables refer to an economy
with a changed health insurance system.
4.3 Optimal Health Insurance Policies
Table 6: Optimal Policies and Welfare Changes
w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Health Insurance System [M,a, b] [0.303, 8.3, 1] [0.308, 0, 0]
Total Change +11.64 +17.32
Consumption
Total +1.68 +3.19
Level +2.68 +3.39
Distribution -1 -0.2
Health
Total +9.96 +14.13
Quantity +1.30 +0.7
Level (Flow) +0.73 +0.57
Distribution (Flow) +7.93 +12.86
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
The health insurance system of the baseline economy is [M,a, b] =
[0.048, 0, 0]
Table 6 shows the optimal health insurance policies and their welfare changes.25 In the econ-
omy with the option to default, the optimal health insurance system indicates that the threshold
of eligible income for Medicaid M¯ is 30.3 percent (approximately $11,039) of the average in-
come in the Baseline economy ($36,432.5), the subsidies for the purchase of IHI, a are given
up to households whose income is between 30.3 percent (approximately $11,039) and 830 per-
cent (approximately $302,390) of the average income in the baseline model ($36,432.5). Thus,
all working-age populations are eligible either for Medicaid or for the subsidy for the purchase
of IHI. However, this does not mean that everyone receives the same amount of benefits. When
household’s income decreases by $1,000 in the interval above M¯ = 0.303, the subsidy increases
by 0.33 percent of the health insurance premium. The optimal health insurance policy implements
the reform of the IHI market in (24). In the economy without the option to default, the optimal
policy is to have a threshold of eligible income for Medicaid M¯ of 30.8 percent (approximately
25Conesa et al. (2009) decomposed welfare changes into these four components, using a feature of the utility func-
tion in their study: the utility function is homothetic with respect to consumption. This model has two differences
from theirs. First, the utility function in this study is homothetic not with respect to consumption but with respect to
both consumption and health. Second, the endogenous survival rate induces an additional source of welfare changes.
To decompose welfare changes, I modify the procedure in Conesa et al. (2009) as follows.
First, I compute the change in the total welfare as CEV in (26). Second, I decompose CEV into welfare changes
due to variation in the survival probability and the rest. I denote changes in welfare due to variation in the survival rate
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$11,221) of the average income in the Baseline economy while not providing a subsidy for IHI,
a = 0, with the absence of its reform, b = 0.
The magnitude of these welfare changes is relatively large, compared to those in the literature.
This difference occurs because the utility follows the complementarity of consumption and health
and contains a substantially large constant term, Bu = 3004.29. Because the complementarity
implies that the marginal utility of consumption increases with health, the compensation under
as CEVq and the rest as CEVf and compute them in the following way:
a =
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,1(s, j))u(c1(s, j), hc,1(s, j))µ1(ds, j)
−
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,0(s, j))u(c0(s, j), hc,0(s, j))µ0(ds, j)
b =
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,0(s, j))u(c1(s, j), hc,1(s, j))µ1(ds, j)
−
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,0(s, j))u(c0(s, j), hc,0(s, j))µ0(ds, j)
CEVq =
a− b
a
· CEV
CEVf =
b
a
· CEV.
Third, I decompose CEVf into changes in welfare due to variations in consumption, CEV
c, and those changes due
to variations in the flow of health CEV h. To do so, let V(c,h) be the lifetime value of households keeping the survival
probability in the baseline economy. Then, let CEV 0c and CEV
0
h be defined as
V ((1 + CEV 0c )c0, (1 + CEV
0
c )h0) = V (c1, h0)
V ((1 + CEV 0h )c0, (1 + CEV
0
h )h0) = V (c0, h1).
Because the utility function is not homothetic with respect to consumption, the summation of CEV 0c and CEV
0
h is
not equal to CEVf . I adjust their scale by defining CEVc and CEVh as follows:
CEVc =
CEV 0c
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEVf
CEVh =
CEV 0h
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEVf .
I further decompose CEV 0c into a level effect CEV
0
cl and a distributional effect CEV
0
cd as follows:
V ((1 + CEV 0cl)c0, (1 + CEV
0
cl)h0) = V (cˆ0, h0)
V ((1 + CEV 0cd)cˆ0, (1 + CEV
0
cd)h0) = V (c1, h0)
where cˆ0 =
C1
C0
c0 is the consumption allocation obtained by rescaling the allocation c0 with the change in aggregate
consumption C1
C0
. Note that CEV 0c ≈ CEV
0
cl+CEV
0
cd, but this does not hold for CEVc. I define CEVcl and CEVcd
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poor health has to be substantially large for an alternative case with better health. Additionally, as
the constant term in the utility,Bu, increases to guarantee the positive value of life with endogenous
default, the impact of changes in consumption on the utility becomes smaller, thereby increasing
the size of required CEVs.
The features of these optimal policies are as follow. First, while the optimal health insurance
policy with the option to default provides subsidies for the purchase of IHI, a = 8.3, to almost all
middle- and high-income households along with the reform of the IHI market, b = 1, that without
the option to default does not change policies relevant to IHI at all, a = b = 0. Second, in both
economies, whereas changes in health are the main driving force behind the welfare improvements
of the optimal health insurance policies, changes in consumption play a relatively larger role in
welfare changes in the case without the option to default. I will examine the mechanisms behind
these results going forward in detail.
4.3.1 The Effect of the Option to Default on the Optimal Health Insurance
Table 7 implies that the option to default results in larger responses of medical spending to health-
care reforms. ‘OPT dd ’ and ‘OPT
nd
d ’ indicate that the optimal policy of the economy with the
option to default, [M,a, b] = [0.303, 8.3, 1], increases the average medical expenditure by 4.81
percent and decreases the coefficient of variation by 2.92 percent when the option to default is
available, while the same policy raises the average medical expenditure by 4.19 percent and re-
duces its coefficient of variation by 2.45 percent when the option to default is unavailable. Simi-
larly, ‘OPT dnd’ and ‘OPT
nd
nd ’ show that the optimal health insurance of the economy with no option
to default, [M,a, b] = [0.308, 0, 0], generates quantitatively larger changes in the average medical
expenditure and its coefficient of variation. These disparities in medical spending lead to differ-
ent evolution of health. For each of the health insurance policies, the option to default generates
a larger increase in average health and further reductions in the standard deviation of the log of
health and the probability of ER visits.
Figure 13 implies that these differences in medical spending and health occur during the
working-age period. The left columns indicate that when the economy implements the optimal
health insurance policy of the economy with the option to default, the option to default generates
larger increases in medical spending and health and further reductions in the coefficient of varia-
as follows:
CEVcl =
CEV 0cl
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEVf
CEVcd =
CEV 0cd
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEVf .
I take the same decomposition as that for the flow of health.
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Table 7: Changes of Health-related Outcomes from Each of the Baseline Economies
Moment OPT dd OPT
nd
d OPT
d
nd OPT
nd
nd M
d
L M
nd
L
OPT DEF Y N Y N Y N
Health Ins. System*
M (MDC Elig.) 0.303 0.303 0.308 0.308 0.1 0.1
a (IHI Subsidy) 8.3 8.3 0 0 0 0
b (IHI Reform) 1 1 0 0 0 0
Health Insurance
Ins. Coverage +18 pp +11 pp +17 pp +11 pp +10 pp +6 pp
MCD Take-up Ratio +27 pp +27 pp +32 pp +32 pp +8 pp +7 pp
IHI Take-up Ratio +36 pp +33 pp −3 pp −6 pp +1 pp +1 pp
EHI Take-up Ratio −46 pp −49 pp −12 pp −15 pp +1 pp −2 pp
IHI Eff. Price −21.82% −18.22% +16.95% +18.37% +19.35% +16.67%
EHI Eff. Price +11.51% +13.84% +5.38% +7.69% −0.53% +2.69%
Medical Expenditure
AVG Medical Exp. +4.81% +4.19% +3.46% +2.98% +1.13% +1.19%
CV of Medical Exp. −2.92% −2.45% −2.81% −2.39% −1.02% −0.73%
Health Measure
AVG Health +4.89% +4.67% +4.62% +4.45% +2.23% +1.77%
STD of Log Health −10.27% −9.78% −9.79% −9.49% −5.08% −4.17%
Prob of ER Visits −8.82% −8.55% −8.37% −8.21% −4.28% −3.51%
Life Expectancy** +0.07 +0.07 +0.07 +0.06 +0.03 +0.03
Welfare Change
Total +11.64% +16.51% +11.55% +17.32% +4.34% +6.43%
Consumption +1.68% +2.5% +2.05% +3.19% +0.78% +1.11%
Health +9.96% +14.02% +9.5% +14.13% +3.55% +5.32%
Health Qty +1.3% +0.73% +1.24% +0.7% +0.55% +0.25%
Health Lvl +0.73% +0.59% +0.7% +0.57% +0.32% +0.22%
Health Dist +7.93% +12.7% +7.57% +12.86% +2.68% +4.85%
OPT d
d
represents the result of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy with the option to default. OPTnd
d
demonstrates results for the economy with no option to default when the optimal policy in the economy with the option to
default is implemented. OPT d
nd
displays results for the economy with the option to default when the optimal policy in the
economy with no option to default is implemented. OPTnd
nd
shows the result of the optimal health insurance policy in the
economy with no option to default. ML
d
demonstrates results for the economy with the option to default when [M,a, b] =
[0.1, 0, 0]. ML
nd
demonstrates results for the economy with no option to default when [M,a, b] = [0.1, 0, 0].
pp = percentage point change,% = percentage change.
* The health insurance system of the baseline economies is [M,a, b] = [0.048 , 0, 0].
** Unit=Year.
tion and the standard deviation of the log of health for working-age households. The right columns
imply qualitatively similar changes to the optimal health insurance policy of the economy without
the option to default. Note that these disparities appear mainly for working-age households be-
cause the option to default is available only to them. As noted in the previous section, when the
option to default is unavailable, households are already more cautious in managing their health by
spending more on health and purchasing more health insurance, even in the baseline health insur-
ance system. Their different attitude to health risks leads to less responsive spending on medical
services and, in turn, health to the healthcare reforms.
Additionally, Table 7 shows that the provision of IHI subsidies and the reform of IHI induce
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Figure 13: Changes in Health and Medical Expenditure from Each of the Baseline Economies
a larger improvement in health and a further reduction in health inequality when the option to
default is available. Since the difference in the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility between
the optimal health insurance of the economy with the option to default and that without the option
to default is small (0.05), changing both from ‘OPT dnd’ to‘OPT
d
d ’ and from ‘OPT
nd
nd ’ to‘OPT
nd
d ’
can be regarded as the provision of IHI subsidies and the reform of the IHI market in addition to
the similar degree of Medicaid expansion. Shifting from the health insurance policy of [0.308, 0, 0]
to that of [0.303, 8.3, 1] increases the average medical expenditure by 0.27 percentage points and
decreases the coefficient of variation of medical expenditures by 0.11 percentage points in the
economy with the option to default, whereas that same policy change raises the average medical
expenditure by 0.23 percentage points and decreases its coefficient of variation by 0.06 percentage
points. Since medical expenditure behavior is closely and positively related to the evolution of
health, changes in health in response to this policy shift in the economy with the option to default
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are larger than those in the economy without the option to default. The policy change increases
average health by 0.27 percentage points and reduces the standard deviation of the log of health
by 0.48 percentage points, while the change increases the average by 0.22 percentage points and
reduces the standard deviation by 0.29 percentage points. This difference implies that the provision
of IHI subsidies and the reform of the IHI market induce households to invest in health directly
and to reduce the dependence on implicit health insurance, thereby leading them to have better and
more equally distributed health.
‘Welfare Change’ in Table 7 implies that in the economy with the option to default, the larger
response of health to IHI-related policies is an important source of further improvements in wel-
fare. More importantly, these further improvements in welfare make substantial differences in the
features of the optimal health insurance policies between the economies with and without the op-
tion to default. More redistributive healthcare reforms involve a trade-off related to changes in
welfare. These reforms may improve welfare by inducing better health outcomes while, at the
same time, they may deteriorate welfare by incurring additional distortions due to more taxes to
be financed. ‘Welfare Change’ indicates that the former is stronger in the economy with the op-
tion to default. Changing from the health insurance policy of [0.308, 0, 0] to that of [0.303, 8.3, 1]
gives rise to further improvements in welfare due to changes in health by 0.46 percentage points
in the economy with the option to default (OPT dnd’ →‘OPT
d
d )’, while it improves welfare from
changes in health by 0.11 percentage points in the economy without the option to default (OPT ndnd ’
→‘OPT ndd ’). The additional improvements are driven mainly by distributional changes in health,
which implies that the provision of subsidies for IHI and the reform of the IHI market are more
effective in producing better health outcomes for low-income households when the option to de-
fault is available. This policy change, meanwhile, reduces welfare from changes in consumption
by 0.37 percentage points in the economy with the option to default, whereas it decreases welfare
from changes in consumption by 0.69 percentage points in the economy without the option to de-
fault. These results mean that the option to default increases the magnitude of improvements in
welfare from changes in health while decreasing that of welfare losses from changes in consump-
tion. The quantitative difference of this trade-off causes the optimal health insurance policies to be
very different according to whether the option to default is available.
Table 8 shows that the absence of the option to default increases the responsiveness of con-
sumption to healthcare reforms, thereby leading to large changes in the aggregate capital. As
noted in Table 5 and Figure 11, shutting down the option to default leads to stronger precaution-
ary motives for saving. In these stronger precautionary saving motives, the expansion of health
insurance coverage induces a larger increase in the level of consumption and a greater reduction
in its inequality. Comparison of ‘OPT dd ’ to ‘OPT
nd
d ’ shows that when the optimal health insur-
ance of the economy with the option to default, [M,a, b] = [0.303, 8.3, 1], is implemented, the
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Table 8: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables from Each of the Baseline Economies
Moment OPT dd OPT
nd
d OPT
d
nd OPT
nd
nd M
d
L M
nd
L
OPT DEF Y N Y N Y N
Health Ins. System*
M (MDC Elig.) 0.303 0.303 0.308 0.308 0.1 0.1
a (IHI Subsidy) 8.3 8.3 0 0 0 0
b (IHI Reform) 1 1 0 0 0 0
Macro Variables
Y +1.83% +1.49% +2% +1.76% +0.81% +0.9%
K/Y -0.56% -1.24% -0.03% -0.58% -0.25% +0.13%
Risk-free Int. Rate +0.06 pp +0.14 pp 0 pp +0.06 pp +0.03 pp −0.01 pp
AVG BOR. Int. Rate −0.04 pp - −0.35 pp - +0.19 pp -
AVG Default Premium −0.1 pp - −0.35 pp - +0.17 pp -
AVG Debt/Earnings -14.73% - -12.65% - -4.53% -
AVG Bankruptcy Rate −0.25 pp −0.2 pp −0.22 pp −0.2 pp 0 pp −0.1 pp
Market Wage -0.31% -0.71% -0.02% -0.32% -0.14% +0.07%
Units of Eff. Labor +2.15% +2.21% +2.02% +2.09% +0.95% +0.82%
AVG Earnings +1.84% +1.5 % +2% +1.77% +0.81% +0.89%
STD of Earnings -3.07% -2.88% -2.99% -2.84% -1.67% -1.33%
AVG Cons +2.56% +3.22% +2.43% +3.22% +0.39% +1.33%
STD of Log Cons -4.37% -7.37% -4.02% -7.27% -1.46% -2.74%
AVG Tax Rate +1.17 pp +1.08 pp +0.84 pp +0.36 pp +0.56 pp +0.01 pp
Welfare Change
Total +11.64% +16.51% +11.55% +17.32% +4.34% +6.43%
Cons +1.68% +2.5% +2.05% +3.19% +0.78% +1.11%
Cons Lvl +2.68% +3.37% +2.54% +3.39% +0.4% +1.35%
Cons Dist -1% -0.87% -0.49% -0.2% +0.38% -0.24%
Health +9.96% +14.02% +9.5% +14.13% +3.55% +5.32%
OPT d
d
represents the result of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy with the option to default. OPTnd
d
demonstrates results for the economy with no option to default when the optimal policy in the economy with the option to
default is implemented. OPT d
nd
displays results for the economy with the option to default when the optimal policy in the
economy with no option to default is implemented. OPTnd
nd
shows the result of the optimal health insurance policy in the
economy with no option to default. ML
d
demonstrates results for the economy with the option to default when [M,a, b] =
[0.1, 0, 0]. ML
nd
demonstrates results for the economy with no option to default when [M,a, b] = [0.1, 0, 0].
pp = percentage point change,% = percentage change.
* The health insurance system of the baseline economies is [M,a, b] = [0.048 , 0, 0].
** Unit=Year.
economy without the option to default generates a larger increase in the average consumption and
a further reduction in inequality in consumption, whereas it has a smaller increase in the aver-
age earnings and a smaller reduction in inequality in earnings. Likewise, comparison ‘OPT ndd ’ to
‘OPT ndnd ’ indicates that the optimal health insurance policy in the case without the option to de-
fault, [M,a, b] = [0.308, 0, 0], yields greater changes in the level and distribution of consumption
to the economy without the option to default, in which the magnitude of changes in the level and
distribution of earnings is smaller. When M = 0.1, qualitatively similar differences also appear,
while the magnitudes are much smaller. These differences in the magnitude of the precautionary
motives for saving influence the level of aggregate capital. For both health insurance policies, the
economies without the option to default show greater reductions in the capital-output ratio than
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those with the option to default.
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Figure 14: Changes in Consumption and Earnings from Each of the Baseline Economies
Figure 14 indicates that in the economies without the option to default, there are greater re-
sponses of consumption to the healthcare reforms because households have stronger precautionary
motives for saving over the life-cycle. The option to default causes a larger increase in the average
earnings and a further reduction in inequality in earnings. The panels of the third row imply that
both health insurance policies induce larger increases in the average earnings over the life-cycle
in the economy with the option to default. The panels of the fourth row indicate that the option
to default gives rise to greater reductions in the standard deviation of the log of earnings. The
panels of the first and second row show that the economies with the option to default generate
smaller increases in the level of consumption and smaller reductions in inequality over the life-
cycle, while these economies have larger changes in the level and distribution of earnings. These
smaller changes in consumption are driven by the weaker precautionary motives for saving in the
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economy with the option to default because households may insure against financial and health
risks by choosing to default. Without the option to default, health insurance policies bring about
greater decreases in the level and inequality of consumption because the policies help households
smooth their consumption across states and over the life-cycle, thereby reducing their precaution-
ary saving.
Table 9: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables from Each of the Baseline Economies in Partial
Equilibrium
Moment OPT dd OPT
nd
d OPT
d
nd OPT
nd
nd
OPT DEF Y N Y N
Health Ins. System*
M (MDC Elig.) 0.303 0.303 0.308 0.308
a (IHI Subsidy) 8.3 8.3 0 0
b (IHI Reform) 1 1 0 0
Macro Variables
Y +1.87% +1.63% +2% +1.84%
K/Y -0.5% -1.08% -0.02% -0.47%
Risk-free Int. Rate 0 pp 0 pp 0 pp 0 pp
AVG BOR. Int. Rate +0.08 pp - −0.33 pp -
AVG Default Premium +0.08 pp - −0.33 pp -
AVG Debt/Earnings -14.26% - -12.66% -
AVG Bankruptcy Rate −0.23 pp −0.2 pp −0.22 pp −0.2 pp
Market Wage 0% 0% 0% 0%
Units of Eff. Labor +2.16% +2.26% +2.02% +2.11%
AVG Earnings +2.16% +2.26 % +2.02% +2.11%
STD of Earnings -3.08% -2.92% -2.99% -2.87%
AVG Cons +2.63% +3.47% +2.44% +3.34%
STD of Log Cons -4.43% -7.51% -4.04% -7.31%
AVG Tax Rate +1.17 pp +1.11 pp +0.5 pp +0.35 pp
Welfare Change
Total +12.02% +17.03% +11.65% +17.58%
Cons +1.99% +2.71% +2.14% +3.31%
Cons Lvl +2.76% +3.63% +2.56% +3.52%
Cons Dist -0.77% -0.92% -0.42% -0.21%
Health +10.03% +14.31% +9.5% +14.27%
OPT d
d
represents the result of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy with the
option to default. OPTnd
d
demonstrates results for the economy with no option to default
when the optimal policy in the economy with the option to default is implemented. OPT d
nd
displays results for the economy with the option to default when the optimal policy in the
economy with no option to default is implemented. OPTnd
nd
shows the result of the optimal
health insurance policy in the economy with no option to default.
pp = percentage point change,% = percentage change.
* The health insurance system of the baseline economies is [M,a, b] = [0.048 , 0, 0].
** Unit=Year.
Figure 14 displays two types of off-setting forces for redistributive health insurance policies in
welfare change due to variations in consumption: reduced precautionary saving vs. tax distortions
with general equilibrium effects. On the one hand, more redistributive reforms can increase the
level of consumption and reduce consumption inequality for working-age households by reducing
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their precautionary saving for medical reasons because these reforms provide policies for these
households. These changes in consumption play a role in improving welfare. The panels of the
first and second rows show that working-age households have a further increase in consumption
and a greater reduction in its inequality. On the other hand, more redistributive health insurance
policies might reduce overall levels of consumption due to tax distortions and general equilibrium
effects. These policies must levy more taxes to be financed, which reduces the supply of aggregate
capital by increasing the after-tax return on savings. Comparison of Table 8 to Table 9 indicates
that general equilibrium effects amplify the reduction in aggregate capital by increasing the risk-
free interest rate, which plays a role in reducing welfare. The top-left panel shows that the optimal
health insurance of the economy with the option to default reduces consumption for households
older than age 70 compared to households in the baseline economy, which is related to tax distor-
tions and general equilibrium effects. Note that as general equilibrium effects become stronger,
their negative effects on welfare dominate the positive effects of reduced precautionary saving on
welfare because this change causes the consumption profile to be more curved.26 The reduced
precautionary motives increase consumption mainly for young households, while the general equi-
librium effects bring a further reduction in consumption for retired households that have no gain
from changes in the health insurance policy.
Table 8 implies that the magnitude of this trade-off differs by the availability of the option
to default, and this quantitative difference plays a role in inducing the features of the optimal
health insurances to be significantly different. Changing from the policy of [0.308, 0, 0] to that of
[0.303, 8.3, 1] decreases the capital-output ratio by 0.66 percentage points in the economy without
the option to default (‘OPT ndnd
′ → ‘OPT ndd
′), while the change reduces the capital-out ratio by
0.33 percentage points in the economy with the option to default (‘OPT dnd
′ → ‘OPT dd
′). These
reduction is amplified more in the case without the option to default due to its stronger general
equilibrium effects. The policy change increases the risk-free interest rate by 0.08 percentage
points in the economy without the option to default, while it raises the risk-free interest rate by
0.06 percentage points in the economy with the option to default. Although the market wage
positively responds to the policy change in all economies, the magnitude is larger in the economy
without the option to default. One may wonder why the economy of ‘OPT ndd ’ shows the same
increase in consumption as the economy of ‘OPT ndnd ’, while the improvement in welfare from
changes in consumption is larger in the economy of ‘OPT ndnd ’. This difference occurs because
the policy of [0.308, 0, 0] results in a smaller increase in consumption for young households and
a smaller reduction for old households than policy of [0.303, 8.3, 1]. The difference in changes in
consumption over age groups is reflected by the smaller welfare loss due to distributional changes
26Recall that welfare improves when the overall level of consumption increases or its life-cycle profile becomes
flatter.
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in consumption in the economy with the option to default (-0.51 p.p vs -0.67 p.p). Although
this trade-off also exists in the economy with the option to default, its magnitude is smaller, and
its improvement in welfare from changes in health is larger, as noted in Table 7 and Figure 13.
Therefore, the optimal health insurance with the option to default is more redistributive than that
without the option to default.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores how defaults and bankruptcies affect optimal health insurance. I build a life-
cycle general equilibrium model in which agents have the option to default on their emergency
medical bills and financial debts. They decide to invest in health capital and occasionally face
emergency room events. Using micro and macro data, I calibrate the model based on the U.S.
economy and use the model for the optimal health insurance policy.
I find that the option to default causes the optimal health insurance to be more redistributive.
With no option to default, the optimal health insurance policy is to expand Medicaid up to house-
holds whose income is 30 percent of the average income with no change in the market of IHI.
When the option to default is available, in addition to Medicaid expansion, the optimal policy is to
provide subsidies for the purchase of IHI and to implement reform of the IHI market.
This difference occurs because the option to default affects the magnitude of off-setting forces
of redistributive healthcare reforms in welfare changes. When the option to default is not avail-
able, households have stronger precautionary motives for saving to take care of their health more
carefully through medical spending. Otherwise, health risks would become substantial financial
burdens over the life-cycle. Households with the option to default, meanwhile, may rely on defaults
and bankruptcies to protect against health and financial risks, thereby having weaker precautionary
motives for saving. These different behavior lead the IHI-related policies to bring the economy
with the option to default to further welfare gains from better health outcomes and smaller wel-
fare losses from tax distortions. Therefore, when defaults and bankruptcies are easily accessible,
implementing more redistributive health insurance policies can improve welfare by reducing the
dependence on this implicit health insurance.
Regarding future research, it is important to understand the effects of other financial institu-
tional features on healthcare reforms. In particular, housing plays an important role in households’
borrowing and saving behavior. How housing policies interact with optimal health insurance needs
to be studied, given the importance of housing in households’ financial activities. In addition, elab-
orating the insurance choice behavior of the elderly is essential. Here, health insurance policies for
the elderly are simplified. Given the considerable effect of long-term care on aggregate savings, as
shown in Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014), studying how long-term care interacts with financial
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risks is a meaningful task. Such analyses are deferred to future work.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A Charges from ER Events across Income Levels
Table 10: Charges from ER Events by Income Groups
Income Average Charges of ER Events*
0-20 pct 2443.56
20-40 pct 2436.46
40-60 pct 2249.54
60-80 pct 2307.37
80-100 pct 2325.41
Source: author’s calculation based on the
MEPS 2000-2011
* Unit = U.S. Dollar in 2000
Table 11: Charges from ER Events by Age and Income Groups
Average Charges for ER Events*
Income Age 23 - 34 Age 35 - 46 Age 47 - 55 Age 56 -64 Age 65 - 76 Age 77 - 91
0-20 pct 1992.87 2222.93 2549.63 3025.09 2616.33 3154.18
20-40 pct 2094.95 2066.45 2752.9 2820.07 2902.95 2657.69
40-60 pct 2030.77 2129.41 2603.14 2625.31 2112.71 2197.29
60-80 pct 2023.42 2244.27 2394.9 2582.79 2348.57 2607.37
80-100 pct 2209.8 2051.07 2577.25 2464.83 2687.7 2284.63
Source: author’s calculation based on the MEPS
* Unit = U.S. Dollar in 2000
Table 12: Regression Result of the Log of ER Charges
Only Income Age and Income
log income 0.122 (0.144) 0.12(0.144)
age 0.005778 (0.004)
I run an OLS regression of the log of ER charges
on the log of income and age.
The parentheses indicate p-values.
1
Table 10 shows that differences in the average charges from ER events are small across income
levels. The maximum gap is smaller than 200 dollars. Table 11 also confirms that the result is still
robust after controlling age groups. There is no monotonic relationship between income and the
amount of charges for ER events across age groups. Lastly, Table 12 indicates that the correlation
between the log of charges for the ER and the log of income is not statistically significant at the 10
percent level.
2
Appendix B Findings on Emergency Room Visits, Medical
Conditions, and Bankruptcy
Table 13: Correlation Between Health Risks and Income
Moment Value
Corr b.w. Medical Conditions and Income −0.146∗
Corr b.w. Fraction of ER Visits and Income −0.078∗
[*]: statistically significant at the 5 level.
Table 13 shows that both medical conditions quantified by health shocks and the fraction of emer-
gency room visits are negatively correlated with income.27 The correlation between medical condi-
tions and income is -0.146, and the correlation of the fraction of emergency room visits and income
is -0.078. This indicates that the level of health risks differs across income levels. Low-income in-
dividuals are more exposed to health shocks than high-income individuals, and the poor are more
exposed to emergency medical events, which is an important channel for default on emergency
medical bills through the EMTALA.
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Figure 15: Age Profile of Medical Conditions
Figure 15 indicates the life cycle profile of medical conditions quantified by health shocks
between high-income individuals and low-income individuals. Differences in medical conditions
across income groups are shown over the whole phase of life-cycle. The gap in medical conditions
increases until age 55 and declines around retirement periods and the difference gets diminished
27Appendix F presents how medical conditions in the Medical Expenditure and Panel Survey (MEPS) are quantified
in details.
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and keeps declining until later life. The gap rapidly rises until age 55, and decreases around
retirement periods and getting smaller in later life. The gap is large when households within an age
group are revealed by more different healthcare circumstances. For example, old households have
small differences, as their healthcare circumstance might be more similar than young households
due to Medicare.
23-34 35-46 47-55 56-64 65-76 77-91
Age
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
Pe
rc
en
t
Fraction of Emergency Room Users
Bottom Income Quintile
Top Income Quintile
23-34 35-46 47-55 56-64 65-76 77-91
Age
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
R
at
io
Fraction of Emergency Room Users of Low Income Relative to High Income
Figure 16: Age Profile of the Fraction of Emergency Room Visits
Figure 16 shows that the fraction of visiting emergency rooms between the top 20 percent
income individuals and the bottom 20 percent income individuals over the life cycle. Differences
in emergency room visits across income groups appear over the whole phase of life-cycle. These
gaps become disproportionately larger during the working-age period. This implies that during the
working-age period, low-income individuals are more substantially exposed to emergency medical
events, which may lead low-income individuals medical defaults through the EMTALA. Given that
old households have more similar health-related circumstances due to Medicare, the gap is larger
when households within an age group have more differences in their health-related circumstances.
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Appendix C Household Dynamic Problems
The households’ optimal decision problems can be represented recursively. I begin with the prob-
lems of working-age households. They start working at the initial age J0 and continue working
until age Jr − 1. The state of working-age households is (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) and υ ∈ {G,B},
where a is their level of assets, i is health insurance, h is the stock of health capital, ǫe is emer-
gency health shock, ǫn is non-emergency health shock, ζ is non-medical expense shocks, η is
idiosyncratic shock on labor productivity and ω is the current offer status for employer-based
health insurance. υ is the current credit history, where G and B mean good and bad credit history,
respectively.
At the beginning of sub-period 1, emergency health shocks ǫe, non-emergency health shocks
ǫn, non-medical expense shocks ζ , idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η, and the employer-
based health insurance offer ω are realized. Next, individuals decide whether to default. Let
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) (V
B
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω)) denote the value function of age j < Jr agent
with a good (bad) credit history in sub-period 1. They solve
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
G,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω), v
G,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (27)
V Bj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
B,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω), v
B,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (28)
where vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) (v
B,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω)) is the value of non-defaulting with
a good credit (bad credit) history and vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) (v
B,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)) is the value of
defaulting with a good credit (bad credit) history. The values of defaulting, vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)
and vB,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω), do not depend on the current assets a, as all assets and debts are elimi-
nated with the default decision, a = 0.
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Non-defaulters with a good credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) = max
{c, a
′
, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ζ
′
, ω
′
)
]
(29)
such that
c+ q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)a
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a
− (1− qni )mn + (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where c is consumption, a
′
is asset holdings in the next period, i
′
is the purchase of health insurance
for the next period, mn is non-emergency medical expenditure, hc is the current health status
and β is the discount rate. πj+1|j(hc, jg) is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 condition on
surviving up to age j with the current status of health hc in age group jg. Eǫ′e|h′ ,ǫ′n|h′ ,η′ |η,ω′ |η′ ,ζ′ is
an expectation that is taken to non-medical expense shocks ζ
′
, (non-) emergency health shocks
(ǫ
′
n) ǫ
′
e, idiosyncratic shocks on labor productivity η
′
and the offer probability of employer-based
health insurance ω
′
, conditional on the current idiosyncratic labor productivity η and health capital
h
′
for the next period. q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is the discount rate of loan for households with future
endogenous state, (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
), conditional on the current idiosyncratic labor productivity, η and
age j, and pi′ (hc, jg) is the premium of health insurance i
′
for the next period given the current
health status hc and age group jg. τss and τmed are payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare,
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respectively. w is the market equilibrium wage, ω¯j is age-deterministic labor productivity, φc is
the elasticity of earnings with respect to current health status hc, and η is idiosyncratic shock on
labor productivity. qni and q
e
i are the coverage rate of health insurance i for non-emergency and
emergency medical expense, respectively. me(ǫe) is emergency medical expense, T (·) is income
tax, y is total income, and κ is accidental bequest. NHI means no health insurance, MCD is
Medicaid, IHI is private individual health insurance, EHI is employer-based health insurance,
y¯ is the threshold for Medicaid eligibility, ω is the current offer status for employer-based health
insurance, qrf is the discount rate of the risk-free bond, and 1a>0 is the indicator function for
savings. Thus, ( 1
qrf
− 1)a means capital income.
Note that the expectation is taken to emergency and non-emergency health shocks conditional
on health capital h
′
for the next period, ǫ
′
e|h
′
and ǫ
′
n|h
′
, as the distributions of these health shocks
are determined by health capital h
′
. In addition, the probability of the offer for employer-based
health insurance is conditional on idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η
′
in the next period, as the
offer rate ω
′
increases with labor productivity level η
′
.
Non-defaulters with a good credit history have an endowment from their labor income
wω¯jh
φh
c η, their current assets a and accidental bequest κ. Then, these households access finan-
cial intermediary to either borrow (a
′
< 0) at prices that reflect their default risk or save (a
′
> 0)
at the risk-free interest rate. Afterward, they make decisions on consumption c, the purchase of
health insurance i
′
and non-emergency medical expenditures mn. In turn, non-defaulters with a
good credit history pay a health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg), an out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures (1− qi)(mn +me(ǫe)), payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicaid (τss + τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η
and income tax T (y) for income y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0. They preserve the good credit
history until the next period.
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Defaulting households with a good credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(30)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− q
n
i )mn − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0.
On their budget constraint, debts from the financial intermediaries a, and emergency medical ex-
penditures me(ǫe) and non-medical expense shocks ζ do not appear, as these individuals default
on these two types of unsecured debts. Defaulters can determine the level of consumption c, the
purchase of health insurance for the next period i
′
, and non-emergency medical expenditure mn,
while they can neither save nor dissave in this period. In turn, they pay a health insurance premium
pi′ (hc, jg), an out-of-pocket medical expenditures (1−qi)mn, payroll taxes for Social Security and
Medicaid (τss + τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η, and income tax T (y) for their labor income y = wωjh
φh
c η.
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Non-defaulters with a bad credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vB,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) = max
{c, a
′
≥0, i
′
,mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu (31)
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
λV Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
+ (1− λ)V Bj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
such that
c+ qrfa
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)(1− χ)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a+ κ
− (1− qni )mn + (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where λ is the probability of recovering their credit history to be good, and χ is a proportion
of earnings that is paid for the pecuniary cost of staying with a bad credit history. Although the
problem of non-defaulters with bad credit is similar to that of non-defaulters with good credit, there
are three differences between two problems. First, non-defaulters with bad credit are not allowed
to borrow but they can save, a
′
≥ 0. Second, they need to pay the pecuniary cost of having a bad
credit history as much as a fraction χ of earnings, χwω¯jh
φh
c η. Lastly, the status of its credit history
in the next period is not deterministic. With a probability of λ, the status of credit history for
non-defaulters with a bad credit history changes to be good, and they stay with a bad credit history
with a probability of 1− λ. This process reflects the exclusion penalty in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy of
10 years in the U.S.
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Defaulters with a bad credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vB,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(32)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)(1− χ)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− qi)mn − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0.
The problem of defaulters with a bad credit history has two differences compared to the case of
households with a good credit history. First, defaulters with a bad credit history have to pay the
pecuniary cost of staying bad credit as much as a fraction χ of their earnings, χwω¯jh
φh
c η. Second,
they default only on emergency medical expenses and non-medical expense shocks. For defaulters
with bad credit, their previous status is either non-defaulter with bad credit or defaulters with good
credit. In both statuses, individuals could not make any financial loan in the previous period.
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Retired households at age Jr ≤ j ≤ J¯ in age group jg solve
V rj (a, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ) = max
{c, a′≥ 0, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+Bu (33)
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,ζ
′
[
V rj+1(a
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
)
]
such that
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
c+ qrfa
′
+ pmed ≤ ss+ a+ κ− (1− q
n
med)mn − (1− q
e
med)me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = ss+ (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where ss is Social Security benefit, pmed is the Medicare premium, and (q
e
med) q
n
med is the coverage
rate of Medicare for (non-) emergency medical expenses. For simplicity, retired households cannot
borrow, but they can save. I assume that retired households do not access private health insurance
markets. Retired households do not have labor income, but receive Social Security benefit, ss, in
each period. Thus, they pay income tax based on Social Security benefit ss and capital income
( 1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0. Retired households do not pay payroll taxes, as they do have labor income.
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Appendix D Proof of proposition 2.7.1
Clausen and Strub (2017) introduce an envelope theorem to prove that First Order Conditions are
necessary conditions for the global solution. They show that the envelop theorem is applicable to
default models where idiosyncratic shocks on earnings are iid. I extend their application to solve
this model, which has persistent idiosyncratic shocks on earnings. To use their envelope theorem,
it is necessary to introduce the following definition.
Definition D.0.1. I say that F : C → R is differentiably sandwiched between the lower and
upper support functions L,U : C → R at c¯ ∈ C if
1. L is a differentiable lower support function of F at c¯,i.e L is differentiable, L(c) ≤ F (c) for
all c ∈ C, and L(c¯) = F (c¯).
2. U is a differentiable upper support function of F at c¯,i.e U is differentiable, U(c) ≥ F (c) for
all c ∈ C, and U(c¯) = F (c¯).
Let us begin with the FOC (17): For any a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
∂u(c, (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h¯)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j + 1)
∂a′
.
Lemma 2 (Maximum Lemma) and Lemma 3 (Reverse Calculus) in Clausen and Strub (2017) tell
me that if each constituent function (q, u,WG) of the FOC (17) has a differential lower support
function at a point a
′
, q × u and WG are differentiable at a
′
and the FOC (17) is a necessary
condition for the global solution.
Formally, the proof of proposition 2.7.1 is as follows:
Proof. u(·, (1−ǫe)(1−ǫn)h¯) has trivially a differentiable lower support function, as itself is differ-
entiable by the assumption. By lemma D.1 and lemma D.2, the discount rate of loan q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
and the expected value functionWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j+1) have a differentiable lower support function,
respectively. That implies that each u(·, (1−ǫe)(1−ǫn)h¯), q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) andWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j+1)
has a differentiable lower support function. Lemma 3 (Reverse Calculus) in Clausen and Strub
(2017) implies that the FOC (17) exists and holds.
LemmaD.1. Let a state (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be given. Let arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be the risk borrowing limit (credit
limit) of q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). For all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), the discount rate of loan q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) has a
differentiable lower support function.
Proof. Case1: For any a ≥ 0, q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) = 1
1+rrf
, and there by
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a
′ = 0. Thus,
q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) itself is a differentiable lower support function.
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Case2: For any arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) < a
′
< 0, q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) = 1−d(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)
1+rrf
. It implies that
finding a lower differentiable support function of q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) is equivalent to doing a upper
differentiable support function of
d(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′ πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (a′ ,s′
1
,η
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1)}
, where s
′
1 = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ω
′
). Let us transform πη′ |η to a continuous PDF f(η
′
|η). Given state
s
′
1, let us denote δ(a
′
, η; s
′
1) = πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′
∫
1{vG,N(a′ ,s
′
1
,η′ ,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η′ ,j+1)}πω′ |η′ f(η
′
|η)dη
′
.
Since a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), {η
′
: vG,N(a
′
, s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1)} is non-empty.
Theorem 3 (The Maximal Default Set Is a Closed Interval) and Theorem 4 (Maximal Default Set
Expands with Indebtedness) in Chatterjee et al. (2007) imply that for any a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) and
for each state (s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) , there are two points η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) and η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) such that (i)
{η
′
: vG,N(a
′
, s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1)} = [η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)] and (ii)
for any a
′
< a
′′
, [η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)] ⊂ [η
′
1(a
′′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′′
; s
′
1, j + 1)]. The first
property means∫
{η
′
:vG,N (a
′
,s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1)}
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
=
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, and the second property implies that η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) increases with a
′
and η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)
decreases with a
′
.
Since
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a′ ;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
=
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
−
∫ η′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, if there is an upper differentiable
support of
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
and an lower differentiable support of∫ η′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, δ(a
′
, η; s
′
1) =
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′ f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has a dif-
ferentiable lower support. Without loss of generality, I will prove the existence of a differentiable
upper support of∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
.
Claim:
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable support.
Proof of the claim: Finding an upper support function of
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
is
equivalent to searching for an upper support function of η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1). I am going to use the
implicit function theorem to find an upper differentiable support. Take any aˆ
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
and η
′
∈ (η
′
1(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1), η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1)). Pick any ǫ1 < η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1)−η
′
1(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1). Con-
sider a case that for a realized value (a
′
, η
′
) ∈ B((aˆ
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ), a household anticipates
state (a
′
, η
′
) = (a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)). In other words, the household correctly recognizes a
′
but
incorrectly acknowledges η
′
. Then, in the period after the next period, the decision rule for asset
holdings is a
′′
= ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1). Define this borrower’s net value function L(a
′
, η
′
; aˆ
′
) on
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B((a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ) in the following way:
L(a
′
, η
′
; aˆ
′
) = u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e)) (34)
−T (y
′
) + κ
′
− q(ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
; η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), j + 1)ga(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
−u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
− (1− qi)m
′
n − T (y
′
) + κ
′
− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η
′
2
(a′ i′′ ,h′′ ),ω′′ |η′′
[ [
V G(ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
−
[
V B(0, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
] ]
Note that the value function is continuous and differentiable on B
(
(aˆ
′
, η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ
)
, as
the utility function u is differentiable. Also, this value function is an implicit function for a
′
and
η
′
, and L(aˆ
′
, η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)); aˆ
′
) = 0. The value function is differentiable with respect to η
′
and
its value is non-zero (positive). Thus, the implicit function theorem implies that there is an open
neighborhood U of aˆ
′
and an open neighborhood V of η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)) such that η¯
′
= η¯
′
(a
′
, aˆ
′
)
satisfies
L(a
′
, η¯
′
(a
′
, aˆ
′
); aˆ
′
) = 0
, where η¯
′
∈ V and a
′
∈ U . Since this household overvalues repaying debt, η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is an upper
support of η
′
2(·; s
′
1, j + 1) at aˆ
′
. Furthermore, the implicit function theorem implies that η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is
differentiable on U . Thus, η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is an upper differentiable support function of η
′
2(·; s
′
1, j + 1)
at aˆ
′
. Since the statement holds for all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) has an upper
differentiable upper support for all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). Therefore, the claim is proven. Q.E.D.
Since
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable support function,
d(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′
,ω
′ πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable
support function.
LemmaD.2. Let a state (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be given. Let arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be the risk borrowing limit (credit
limit) of q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). For all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), the expected value functionWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; η, j+
1) has a differentiable lower support function.
Proof. To ease notation, let us denote s
′
1 = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, ǫe, ǫn, η
′
, ω
′
)
(i) Case 1: a¯
′
> 0.
In this case, the discount rate of loan becomes qrf . I can use the standard technique of Benveniste
and Scheinkman’s theorem. Consider a case that for a realized value (a
′
, η
′
), a household takes
a
′′
= ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1) for all a
′
and η
′
. Let us define this agent’s net value function L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) in
14
the following way:
L0(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
, s
′
1) = u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e))− T (y
′
) + κ
′
− qrfga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
(35)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V G(ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
Since there is no debt, the agent does not default. Thus, L0(a¯
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) = V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1) = v
G,N(a¯
′
, s
′
1)
and L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) ≤ V G(a
′
, s
′
1) for all a
′
≥ 0. Moreover, L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) is differentiable at a¯′ . There-
fore, L(·, η
′
; a¯
′
) is a lower differentiable support function of V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1).
(ii) Case2: arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) < a¯
′
< 0.
Let us consider a case for realized value (a
′
, η
′
), a household takes a
′′
= ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1) for all a
′
and η
′
. Let us define this agent’s net value function L1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) in the following way:
L1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
, s
′
1) = max
{
u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e)) (36)
−T (y
′
) + κ
′
− q − q(ga(a
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
; η
′
, j + 1)ga(a
′
, s
′
1, j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V G(ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
,
u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
− (1− qi)m
′
n − T (y
′
) + κ
′
− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V B(0, i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]}
L1(a¯
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) = V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1) and L
1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) ≤ V G(a
′
, s
′
1) for all a
′
≥ 0. Moreover, L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) is
differentiable with respect to a
′
. Therefore, L1(·, η
′
; a¯
′
) is a lower differentiable support function
of V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1).
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Appendix E Recursive Equilibrium
I define a measure space to describe equilibrium. To ease notation, I denote S = A× I×H×ER×
NER × E × O × Υ as the state space of households, where A is the space of households’ assets
a, I is the space of households’ health insurance i, H is the space of households’ health capital h,
ER is the space of emergency health shocks ǫe, NER is the space of non-emergency health shocks
ǫn, O is the space of the offer of employer-based health insurance ω and Υ is the space of credit
history υ ∈ {G,B}. In addition, let B(S) denote the Borel σ-algebra on S. In addition, I denote
J = {J0, · · · , Jr, · · · , J¯} as the space of households’ age. Then, for each age j, a probability
measure µ(·, j) is defined on the Borel σ-algebra B(S) such that µ(·, j) : B(S) −→ [0, 1]. µ(B, j)
represents the measure of age j households whose state lies in B ∈ B(S) as a proportion of all age
j. The households’ distribution at age j in age group jg evolves as follows: For all B ∈ B(S),
µ(B, j + 1) =
∫
{s|(ga(s,j),gi(s,j),gh(s,j),ǫ′e,ǫ′n,η′ ,ω′ ,υ′)∈B}
[
Γυ
′
υ πj+1|j(hc, jg) πǫ′e|gh(s,j) πǫ′n|gh(s,j) πη′ |η πω′ |η′
]
µ(ds, j) (37)
where s = (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, υ) ∈ S is the individual state. ga(·, j) is the policy function for
assets at age j, gi(·, j) is the policy function for health insurance at age j, and gh(·, j) is the policy
function for health investment at age j. In addition, Γυ
′
υ is the transitional probability of credit
history υ
′
in the next period conditional on the current status of credit history υ, πj+1|j(hc, jg)
is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 conditional on surviving up to age j with the current
health status hc in age group jg and πǫ′e|gh(s,j) (πǫ
′
n|gh(s,j)
) is the transition probability for ǫ
′
e (ǫ
′
n)
conditional on gh(s, j). πη′ |η is the transitional probability of idiosyncratic labor productivity for
the next period η
′
conditional on η and πω′ |η′ is the probability of receiving an employer-based
health insurance offer ω
′
for the next period conditional on η
′
.
Definition E.0.1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). Given an distribution of newborn agents
B0 ∈ S, a social Security benefit ss, a Medicare coverage rate qmed, a Medicare premium pmed,
a subsidy rule for employer-based health insurance ψEHI , mark-ups of health private insurances
νIHI and νEHI , an income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯, health insurance coverage rates
{qMDC , qIHI , qEHI}, private individual health insurance pricing rules {pIHI(·, jg)}
4
jg=1, subsidies
for private individual health insurances ψEHI(·, ·), a tax policy, {T (·), τss, τmed},
a recursive competitive equilibrium is
a set of prices
{
w, rrf , r, qrf , {q(·, ·, ·, j, ·)}Jr−1j=J0 , {p(·, jg)}
4
jg=1, pmed
}
, a set of the mark-up of hospital {ζ}
, a set of decision rules for households
{
{gd(·, j), ga(·, j), gi(·, j), gh(·, j)}
J¯
j=J0
}
, a set of default probability function
{
d(·, ·, ·; j, ·)}J¯j=J0
}
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, a set of values
{{
V G(·, j), vG,N(·, j), vG,D(·, j), V B(·, j), vB,N(·, j), vB,D(·, j)
}Jr−1
j=J0
,
{
vG,r(·, j), vB,r(·, j)
}J¯
j=Jr
}
and distributions of households {µ(·, j)}J¯j=J0 such that
(i) Given prices, the policies above, the decision rules gd(s, j), ga(s, j), gi(s, j) and gh(s, j)
solve the household problems in Appendix C and V G(·, j), vG,N(·, j), vG,D(·, j), V B(·, j)
, vB,N(·, j), vB,D(·, j), vG,r(·, j) and vB,r(·, j) are the associated value functions.
(ii) Firm is competitive pricing:
w =
∂zF (K,N)
∂N
, r =
∂zF (K,N)
∂K
, where K is the quantity of aggregate capital, and N is the quantity of aggregate labor.
(iii) Loan prices and default probabilities are consistent, whereby lenders earn zero expected
profits on each loan of size a
′
for households with age j that have health insurance i
′
for
the next period, health capital h
′
for the next period and the current idiosyncratic shock on
earnings η:
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
(1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η))
1 + rrf
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (s′n,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
d
,j+1)}
, where s
′
n = (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j + 1) and s
′
d = (i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j + 1).
(iv) The hospital has zero profit:
J¯∑
j=J0
∫ {
[mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j))me(ǫe) + gd(s, j)max (a, 0)]
−
(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))
ζ
}
µ(ds, j) = 0.
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(v) The bond market and the capital market are clear:
rrf = r − δ
qrf =
1
1 + rrf
K =
J¯∑
j=J0
[ ∫ (
q(ga(s, j), gi(s, j), gh(s, j); j, η)ga(s, j)
+ (p(gi, hc, jg) · 1{gi(s,j)∈{IHI,EHI}
)
µ(ds, j)
]
.
(vi) The labor market is clear:
N =
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[
ω¯j
∫
((1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)hη)µ(ds, j)
]
.
(vii) The goods market is clear:
J¯∑
j=J0
[∫ (
c(s, j) +
mn(s, j) +me(ǫe)
ζ
)
µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Non-medical Consumption + Aggregate Medical Expenditures
+K − (1− δ)K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Investment
+ G︸︷︷︸
Government Spending
+
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[ ∫ { (
ψIHI(pIHI(hc, jg), y(s, j)) · 1{gi(s,j)=IHI}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Government Subsidy for Private Individual Health Insurance IHI
+
(
ψEHI · pEHI · 1{gi(s,j)=EHI}
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Government Subsidy for Employer-Based Health Insurance EHI
µ(ds, j)
]
= zF (K,N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Output
−χw
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[
ω¯j
∫
((1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)hcgd(s, j))µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadweight Loss from Default
−
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[∫ (
νgipgi(hc, jg)1{gi(s,j)∈{IHI,EHI}
)
µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadweight Loss due to the Mark-up of Private Health Insurance Markets
.
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(viii) The insurance markets are clear:
For each age group jg and each health group hg, the premium of the private individual health
insurance pIHI(hg, jg) satisfies
(1 + νIHI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mark-up of IHI
∑
j∈Jg
∫
qIHI · 1{{i=IHI}∩{h∈hg}} · (mn(s, j) +me(ǫe,t))µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Medical Expenditure Covered by IHI
= (1 + rrf ) pIHI(hg, jg)
∑
j∈Jg
∫
1{{gi(s,j)=IHI}∩{h∈hg}}µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Demand for IHI
.
The premium of the employer-based health Insurance pEHI satisfies
(1 + νEHI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mark-up of EHI
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
qEHI · 1{i=EHI}(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Medical Expenditure Covered by EHI
= (1 + rrf ) · pEHI ·
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
1{gi(s,j)=EHI}µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Demand for EHI
.
(ix) Social Security (ss) and Medicare are financed by their own objective payroll taxes τss and
τmed. The government budget constraint is balanced:
J¯∑
j=Jr
∫
(ss)µ(ds, j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Social Security Benefit
=
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
τsswω¯jhcηµ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Social Security Tax
J¯∑
j=Jr
∫  qmed(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Medical Expenses Covered by Medicare
− pmed︸︷︷︸
Medicare Premium

µ(ds, j) = Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
τmedwω¯jhcηµ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Medicare Tax
G︸︷︷︸
Government Spending
+
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[ ∫ { (
ψIHI(pIHI(hc, jg), y(s, j)) · 1{gi(s,j)=IHI}
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy for IHI
+
(
ψEHI · pEHI · 1{gi(s,j)=EHI}
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy for EHI
}
µ(ds, j)
]
=
J∑
j=0
∫
T (y)µ(ds, j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Income Tax
.
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(x) Distributions are consistent with individual behavior.
For all j ≤ J¯ − 1 and for all B ∈ B(S),
µ(B, j + 1) =
∫
{s|(ga(s,j),gi(s,j),gh(s,j),ǫ′e,ǫ′n,η′ ,ω′ ,υ′)∈B}
[
Γυ
′
υ πj+1|j(hc, jg) πǫ′e|gh(s,j) πǫ′n|gh(s,j) πη′ |η πω′ |η′
]
µ(ds, j)
, where s = (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, υ) ∈ S is the individual state.
(xi) Accidental bequests κ are evenly distributed to all of the households:
κ =
J¯−1∑
j=J0
(∫
[(1− πj+1|j(hc, jg))(a(1 + r
rf )) · 1{a>0}]µ(ds, j)
)
.
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Appendix F Data Details
F.1 Data Cleansing
I choose the MEPS waves from 2000 to 2011. Among various data files in MEPS, by using indi-
vidual id (DUPERSID), I merger three types of data files: MEPS Panel Longitudinal files, Medical
Condition files, and Emergency Room visits files. To clean this data set, I take the following steps.
First, I identify household units with the Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU). Second, I de-
fine household heads who have the highest labor income within a HIEU. I eliminate households
in which the heads are non-respondents for key variables such as demographic features, educa-
tional information, medical expenditures, health insurance, health status, and medical conditions.
Second, among working age (23-64) head households, I drop families that have no labor income.
Third, I use the MEPS longitudinal weight in MEPS Panel Longitudinal file for each individual.
Since each survey of MEPS Panel Longitudinal files covers 2 consequent years, I stack individuals
in the 10 different panels into one data set. To use the longitudinal weight with my stacked data
set, I follow the way in Jeske and Kitao (2009). As they did, I rescale the longitudinal weight in
each survey to make the sum of the weight equal to the number of HIEUs. In this way, I address
the issues of different size of samples across surveys and reflect the longitudinal weight in each
survey. Lastly, I convert all nominal values into the value of U.S. dollar in 2000 with the CPI. The
number of observations in each panel is as follows.
Year 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006
Numbers 5218 10187 7484 7577 7548 7294
Year 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011
Numbers 7721 5835 8611 7988 7020
Table 14: MEPS Panel Sample Size
F.2 Variable Definitions
Household Unit(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files, Medical Condition files, and Emergency
Room visits files): To define households, I use the Health Insurance Eligibility Units (HIEU) in
the MEPS. To capture behavior related to health insurance, the HIEU is a more proper id than
dwelling unit. Since the HIEU is different from dwelling unit, even within a dwelling unit, multi-
ple HIEUs can exist. A HIEU includes spouses, unmarried natural or adoptive children of age 18
or under and children under 24 who are full-time students.
Head(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS does not formally define heads in households.
I define head by choosing the highest earner within a HIEU.
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Household Income (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS records individual total in-
come (TTLPY1X and TTPLY2X). Household income is the summation of all house members’
total income.
Medical Expenditures (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS provides information on
individual total medical expenditures (TOTEXPY1 and TOTEXPY2). However, this variable in-
cludes medical expenditures paid for by Veteran’s Affairs (TOTVAY1 and TOTVAY2), Workman’s
Compensation (TOTWCPY1 and TOTWCPY2) and other sources (TOTOSRY1 and TOTOSRY2)
that are not covered in this study, I redefine the total medical expenditure variable by subtracting
these three variables from the original total medical expenditure variable.
Insurance Status(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): For working age head households, I catego-
rize four type of health insurance status: uninsured, Medicaid, individual health insurance, and
employer-based health insurance. The MEPS records whether each respondent has a health in-
surance, whether the insurance is provided by the government or private sectors (INSCOVY1 and
ISCOVY2), and whether to use Medicaid (MCDEVY1 and MCDEVY2). Using this variable, I de-
fine the uninsured and Medicaid users. The MEPS also records employer-based health insurance
holders (HELD1X, HELD2X, HELD3X, HELD4X, HELD5X) for five subsequent survey periods.
I define employer-based health insurance holders who have experience in holding employer-based
health insurance within a year. I define individual health insurance holders as those who do not
have employer-based health insurance (HELD1X, HELD2X, HELD3X, HELD4X, HELD5X) but
have a private health insurance (INSCOVY1 and INSCOVY2).
Employer-Based Health Insurance Offer rate (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS
provides information as to whether respondents’ employer offers health insurance (OFFER1X,
OFFER2X, OFFER3X, OFFER4X, OFFER5X).
Medical Conditions (Medical Condition files): The Medical Condition Files in the MEPS keep
track of individual medical condition records with various measures. I choose Clinical Classifica-
tion Code for identifying individual medical conditions (CCCODEX).
Health Shocks (Medical Condition files and morbidity measures from the WHO): In order to
quantify these individual medical conditions, I use a measure from the World Health Organization
(WHO). The WHO provides two types of measures to quantify the burden of diseases: mortality
measures (years of life lost to illness (YLL) and morbidity measures (years lived with disabil-
ity (YLD)). I use the adjusted morbidity measure in the study of Prados (2017). Table 15 is the
morbidity measures in Prados (2017).
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Table 15: Disability Weights (Source:Prados (2017))
For calculating health shocks from medical conditions, I follow the method in Prados (2017).
Let’s assume that a household hasD kinds of medical conditions. Denote di as the WHO index for
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medical condition i, where i = 1, . . . , D. For this household, its health shock ǫh is represented by
(1− ǫh) =
D∏
i=1
(1− di). (38)
This measure well represents the features of medical condition in the sense that it reflects not only
multiple medical conditions but also differences in their severity.
Emergency Room Usages and Charges (Emergency Room Visits files): Emergency Room Vis-
its files in the MEPS record respondents who visit emergency rooms. These files records the Clin-
ical Classification Code as to why respondents visit emergency rooms (ERCCC1X, ERCCC2X,
ERCCC3x) and as to how much hospitals charge from emergency medical events to patients
(ERTC00X).
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Appendix G Computation Details
There are computational burdens in this problem, because not only the dimension of individual
state is large, but also the value functions of the model are involved with many non-concave and
non-smooth factors: the choice of default, health insurance, medical cost, progressive subsidy and
tax policies.
To solve the model with these complexities, I extend the endogenous grid method of Fella
(2014). He provides an algorithm to handle non-concavities on the value functions with an ex-
ogenous borrowing constraint. I generalize the method for default problems in which borrowing
constraints differ across individuals.
Whereas there are several types of value functions in the model, the computational issues are
mainly related to four types of value functions: the value function of non-defaulting households
with a good (bad) credit history vG,N (vB,N), the value function of retired households with a good
(bad) credit history vG,r (vB,r).28 The value function with a bad credit history and two retired
households’ value functions are solved with the algorithm of Fella (2014), because these problems
have an exogenous borrowing constrain with discrete choice, which is consistent with the setting
of Fella (2014). My endogenous grid method is for solving the value function of non-defaulting
with a good credit history vG,N in which loan prices differ across individuals states.29
In the following subsections, first, I demonstrate how to solve the value of non-defaulting
households with a good credit history vG,N with my endogenous grid method.30 Then, I show how
to solve the other value functions with the endogenous grid method of Fella (2014).
G.1 Notation and Discretization of States
Before getting into details, let us begin with notations to explain the algorithm. To ease
notation, I denote s−a = (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) and s
′
p = (i
′
, h
′
, η, j). Then, V G(a, s−a) =
V G(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) and q(a
′
, s
′
p) = q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η). I also denote WG(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) =
WG(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) as the expected value function of working households with good credit
conditional on η, hc, age j and age group jg, πj+1|j(hc, jg)Eǫ′e|h′ ,ǫ′n|h′ ,η′ |η,ω′ |η′
[
V G(a
′
, s
′
−a)
]
.
Ga′ = {a
′
1, · · · , a
′
N
a
′
} and GO = {O1, · · · , ONO} are the grid of asset holdings a
′
and cash on
hand O, respectively.
In the model, households need to make choices on three individual state variables: assets a,
health insurance i, and health capital h. I discretize two endogenous states: health insurance i and
28The value function of filing for default is not involved with any continuous choice variable.
29Jang and Lee (2019) extend this endogenous grid method to solve infinite horizon models with default risk and
aggregate uncertainty.
30The steps I use here are also described in Jang and Lee (2019). They extend this endogenous grid method to solve
an infinite horizon model with default risk and aggregate uncertainty.
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health capital h. I apply the endogenous grid method to assets a by taking this variable as continu-
ous. This way is efficient because the variation of assets is the largest among the endogenous state
variables. When solving the problems, I regard the choice of health insurance i¯
′
and health capital
for the next period h¯
′
as given states, and apply the endogenous grid method to asset holdings a
′
in the next period.
G.2 Calculating the Risky Borrowing Limit (Credit Limit) (vG,N)
I set up the feasible sets of the solution based on the work in Arellano (2008) and Clausen and Strub
(2017). They investigate the property of the risky borrowing limits (credit limits). They show that
the size of loan q(a
′
)a
′
increases with a
′
for any optimal debt contract. If the size of loan q(a
′
)a
′
decreases in a
′
, households can increase their consumption by increasing debts, which is not an
optimal debt contract. Arellano (2008) (Clausen and Strub (2017)) defines the risky borrowing
limit (credit limit) to be the lower bound of the set for optimal contract. For example, in Figure 17,
B∗ is the risky borrowing limit.
Figure 17: Risky Borrowing Limit (Arellano (2008))
For each state s
′
p = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, j, η), I calculate the risky borrowing limit a
′
rbl(s
′
p) such that
∀a
′
≥ arbl(s
′
p),
∂q(a
′
, s
′
p)a
′
∂a′
=
∂q(a
′
, s
′
p)
∂a′
a
′
+ q(a
′
, s
′
p) > 0. (39)
I compute the numerical derivative of the discount rate of loan prices q(a
′
, s
′
p) over the grid of asset
holdings Ga′ in the following way:
Da′q(a
′
k, s
′
p) =


q(a
′
k+1
,s
′
p)−q(a
′
k
,s
′
p)
a
′
k+1
−a
′
k
, for k < Na′
q(a
′
k
,s
′
p)−q(a
′
k−1
,s
′
p)
a′
k
−a′
k−1
, for k = Na′ .
(40)
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I calculate the risky borrowing limit arbl(·) for each state s
′
p and fix them as the lower bound of the
feasible set for the solution of asset holdings a
′
. For each state s
′
p, I denoteG
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
as the collection
of all of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
k above the risky borrowing limit arbl(s
′
p), which means
for all a
′
k ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
, a
′
k > arbl(s
′
p).
G.3 Identifying (Non-) Concave Regions
Note that the FOC (17) is not sufficient but necessary, because of non-concavities on the expected
value functionWG(a
′
, s
′
p)with respect to a
′
. If the concave regions can be identified, the FOC (17)
is a sufficient and necessary condition for an optimal choice of asset holdings a
′
on the concave
region. I use the algorithm of Fella (2014) to divide the domain of the expected value functions
G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ into the concave and non-concave regions.
For each state s
′
p, the concave region is identified by two threshold grid points a¯
′
(s
′
p) and a
′
(s
′
p)
that satisfy the following condition: for any a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
and a
′
j ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
with a¯
′
(s
′
p) < a
′
i < a
′
j
(a
′
i < a
′
j < a
′
(s
′
p)), Da′W
G(a
′
i, s
′
p, hc) > Da′W
G(a
′
j, s
′
p, hc).
31 This condition implies that for all
grid points of which values are greater than a¯
′
(s
′
p) (less than a
′
(s
′
p)), the derivative of the expected
value function Da′ (·, s
′
p) strictly decreases with asset holdings a
′
.
For each state s
′
p, I take the following steps to find the thresholds a¯
′
(s
′
p) and a
′
(s
′
p). First, I
check the discontinuous points of the derivative of the expected value function Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc).
I compute the derivative of the expected value function Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) in the same way as
the derivative of the discount rate of loan price (40). Second, among the discontinuous points,
I find the minimum value, which is vmax(s
′
p). Third, I search for the maximum a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′
satisfying Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) ≤ vmax(s
′
p). The maximum is defined as a¯
′
(s
′
p). Fourth, among the
discontinuous points, I find the maximum value, which is vmin(s
′
p). Then, I search for the minimum
a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ satisfying Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) ≥ vmin(s
′
p).The minimum is defined as a
′
(s
′
p).
G.4 Computing the Endogenous Grid for the Cash on Hand
∂q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k
∂a′
∂u(c, hc)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
k, s
′
p,hc)
∂a′
. (41)
First, for each state s
′
p and hc, and for each grid point a
′
k ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ , I retrieve the endogenously-
driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) from the FOC (41). Since the utility function has a CES aggre-
gator, the endogenously-driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) cannot be computed analytically. I use
31For each s
′
p, the thresholds are the same across hc because the survival rate πj+1|j(hc, jg) is a constant number.
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the bisection method to compute the endogenously-driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc). Second, I
compute the endogenously-determined cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) = c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) + q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k.
Lastly, I store the pairs of ((a
′
k, s
′
p, hc), O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
G.5 Storing the Value Function over the Endogenous Grid for Cash on
Hand
For each state s
′
p and hc, and for each grid point ak ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ , I compute the value function of
non-defaulters with good credit vG,N over the endogenous grid for cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) in
the following way:
v˜G,N(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc), s
′
p, hc) = u(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)− q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k,hc) +Bu +W
G(a
′
k, s
′
p,hc). (42)
Note that (i) (42) is irrelevant to any max operator and (ii) the value function
vG,N(O(a
′
k, s
′
p), s
′
p) is valued on the endogenous grid, not on the exogenous grid. I store the com-
puted value vG,N over the endogenous grid for cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p).
G.6 Identifying the Global Solution on the Endogenous Grid for Cash on
Hand
Using information about the identification of (non-) concave regions on asset holdings a
′
in G.3, I
identify the global solutions on the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
Specifically, I take the following steps. First, for each state (s
′
p, hc), I identify (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc))
as the pairs of the global solution if a
′
k ≥ a¯
′
(s
′
p) or a
′
k ∈ [arbl(s
′
p), a
′
(s
′
p)]. Note that the FOC (17)
is sufficient and necessary here, as these pairs are on the concave region of the global solution. I
save these pairs.
Second, for each state (s
′
p, hc) and each a
′
k ∈ (a
′
(s
′
p), a¯
′
(s
′
p)), I check whether the pair of
(a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solution in the following way:
a
′
g = argmax
{a
′
j∈(a
′
(s′p),a¯
′ (s′p))}
u(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)− q(a
′
j, s
′
p)a
′
j, hc) + Bu +W
G(a
′
j, s
′
p, hc). (43)
If a
′
g = a
′
k, then I identify the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) as an global solution. Otherwise, I discard
the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
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G.7 Interpolating the Value Function on the Endogenous Grid for Assets
Given the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I compute the corresponding cur-
rent assets a. Due to the non-linear progressive tax and insurance subsidies, for each pair of
(a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and for each (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I find the corresponding assets a by using the Newton-
Raphson method. Then I obtain the pairs of (a(a
′
ks
′
,hc, i,h, ǫe, ǫn), a
k). Note that these pairs cor-
respond to global solutions, as the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solutions.
G.8 Interpolating the Value Function on the Endogenous Grid for Assets
Given the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I compute the corresponding cur-
rent assets a. Due to the non-linear progressive tax and insurance subsidies, for each pair
of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and for each (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I find the corresponding assets a by using
the Newton-Raphson method. Then, for each state, (s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I obtain the pairs of
(a(a
′
k, s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), a
′
). Note that these pairs correspond to global solutions, as the saved pairs
of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solutions.
G.9 Evaluating the Value Function over the Exogenous Grid for the Current
Assets
Since the value function v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N preserve the monotonicity with the current
asset a, it is possible to interpolate the value on the exogenous grid for assets Ga. For each state
(s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), using a linear interpolation, I find a0 such that a0 = a(a
′
= 0, s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn).
If the value of grid ai ∈ Ga is above a0, I use a linear interpolation to compute the value
function of v˜G,N and gG,N on the exogenous grid of the current assets Ga. If ai ∈ Ga is lower than
a0, I use the grid search method.
G.10 Optimize the discrete choices
Until this step, the choice of health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
are given statuses. Optimize
these two choices by searching the grid for each variable. The number of grid points for these
variables is relatively smaller than that of grid points on asset a. Therefore, the computation is not
so costly in this procedure. Formally, solve the following problems:
vG,N(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) = max
{i
′
,h
′
}
v˜G,N(a, i
′
, h
′
, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j)
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G.11 Interpolating the Value Function on the Grid for Assets
Given a state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), since the level of assets a has a monotonic relation with cash
on hand O, it is possible to interpolate the value function v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N over the
exogenous grid of cash on hand GO into the grid for assets Ga. Due to the non-linear progressive
tax and insurance subsidies, for each state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), and for each grid point of the cash
on hand Ok ∈ GO, I find the corresponding assets a by using the Newton-Raphson method.
Next, using a linear interpolation, for each state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I evaluate the value function
v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N on the grid for the current assets Ga.
G.12 Optimize the discrete choices
Until this step, the choice of health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
are given statuses. Optimize
these two choices by searching the grid for each variable. The number of grid points for these
variables is relatively smaller than that of grid points on asset a. Therefore, the computation is not
so costly in this procedure. Formally, solve the following problems:
vG,N(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) = max
{i′ ,h′}
v˜G,N(a, i
′
, h
′
, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j)
G.13 Solving the Other Values
I use the grid search method to solve defaulting values vG,D and vB,D, because they do not an
intertemporal choice on assets and the number of grid points over health insurance i and health
status h is relatively small.
For values of retired households vG,r and vB,r and values of non-defaulting households with
a bad credit history vB,N , I apply the endogenous grid method of Fella (2014). It is almost the
same as the previous steps other than G.2, as there is no unsecured debt in these problems. The
lower bounds of feasible solution set are given by zero assets (vB,N , vB,r) or the natural borrowing
limit (vG,r). Precisely, with the predetermined borrowing limits, I take the steps of Section G.1
and Section G.3- Section G.11.
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G.14 Updating the Expected Value Functions and Loan Price Schedules for
age j − 1
First, I update the value functions V G(s) and V B(s).
V G(s) = max{vG,N(s), vG,D(s−a)} (44)
V B(s) = max{vG,N(s), vG,D(s−a)}
Second, I update the expected value functions WG(s
′
p, hc) and W
B(s
′
p, hc) for age j − 1 and age
group jg.
WG(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) = πj|j−1(hc, jg)
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′V
G(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η
′
e, η
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j)
WB(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) = πj|j−1(hc, jg)
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′V
B(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η
′
e, η
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j)
(45)
Lastly, the loan price function q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; , j − 1, η) is updated in the following way:
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) =
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (a′ ,i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′ ,ω′ ,j) ≤ vG,D(i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′ ,ω′ ,j)}
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) =
1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)
1 + rrf
where d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) is the expected default probability with state (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η).
I repeatedly take these steps (G.1 - G.10) until the initial age.
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Appendix H Offer Rate of Employer-Based Health Insurance
Table 16: Offer Rate of Employer-Based Health Insurance
Age
Earnings PCT 23-34 35-46 47-55 56-64
0-2.9 0.413 0.365 0.368 0.399
2.9-6.6 0.449 0.487 0.428 0.43
6.6-12.3 0.322 0.386 0.4 0.376
12.3-20.5 0.352 0.437 0.514 0.494
20.5-31.1 0.376 0.597 0.669 0.633
31.1-43.5 0.511 0.744 0.793 0.747
43.5-56.5 0.673 0.834 0.845 0.789
56.5-68.9 0.791 0.89 0.878 0.82
68.9-79.5 0.846 0.91 0.899 0.847
79.5-87.7 0.884 0.912 0.902 0.855
87.7-93.4 0.916 0.918 0.9 0.859
93.4-97.1 0.912 0.887 0.876 0.813
97.1-100 0.884 0.912 0.913 0.854
Source: author’s calculation based on the MEPS
2000-2011
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